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ABSTRACT 
 
Through our history, South African women have been a disadvantaged and vulnerable group 
in our society. Therefore, they still require the protection of their fundamental rights afforded 
by the Constitution. This dissertation sets out to evaluate civil remedies that are appropriate 
for cervical cancer patients, who have suffered and continue to suffer, from harm caused by 
the recent oncology crisis in the KZN public health sector.  
This dissertation explores the impact of delayed oncology treatment on cervical cancer 
patients, during the period 2015 – 2017. This has been done through the findings of the 
SAHRC’s investigation into the crisis, as well as other key individuals who have been 
advocates for the health rights of South African women.  
It also highlights the various constitutional and legislative breaches, particularly the right of 
access to health care as envisaged by section 27 of the Constitution. The actions of the KZN 
Health Management have also been evaluated using the findings of the KZN Treasury and 
advocacy groups, to determine these member’s contribution to the breakdown of oncology 
services in KZN. This may be used as a guide to evaluate who may be held liable for the 
harm caused to cervical cancer patients. The dissertation also goes on to emphasise the need 
for disciplinary action by the HPCSA, for members of the KZN Health Management who are 
also practicing medical practitioners. 
Finally, this dissertation proposes civil remedies that are available to cervical cancer patients, 
as well as, the dependants of women who have died as a result of not receiving timeous 
treatment. This has been done against the complex backdrop of socio-economic right 
violations, and the need for effective relief under such circumstances.  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
‘Health care is an essential safeguard of human life and dignity and there is an 
obligation for society to ensure that every person be able to realise this right’ 
 – Joseph Bernardin 
 
1.1   Background & Overview of Oncology Crisis in KZN 
Recently there has been mounting public concern about the current oncology crisis in 
KwaZulu-Natal, particularly in Durban. This is a manifestation of the build-up of 
maladministration and other related factors in the Provincial Department of Health for a 
considerable time, as published in the South African Human Rights Commission (herein 
referred to as SAHRC or the commission) report on this issue.1  
The public’s concern increased when a complaint was submitted to the SAHRC by 
Democratic Alliance (DA) MPL Dr. Imran Keeka. ‘The report came in the wake of 
revelations that Durban’s government-run oncology services had been stripped of 
practitioners, with doctors leaving for the private sector because of unsatisfactory working 
conditions that included a lack of functioning equipment for cancer treatment’.2 The written 
complaint to the SAHRC by Dr. Keeka, was submitted on or about 19 February 2016.3  
Following the investigations carried out by the SAHRC, recommendations were made to all 
persons mentioned in the report4 in June 2017.5 Despite several claims by the Provincial 
Health MEC, Dr. Sibongiseni Dhlomo, that inoperative machines used for diagnosis and 
treatment would be repaired and new machines would be installed, the situation at oncology 
units of the public health sector in Durban has worsened. More than 6 months had passed 
since the SAHRC handed down recommendations,6 and Dr Keeka has stated that currently 
there are no oncologists in the Durban metro area, with the KZN Health Department only 
expecting a specialist oncologist from the Western Cape pending successful results in the 
student’s final examinations. 7  
It is submitted that owing to the current challenges in public health care, the provision of 
oncology services in KwaZulu-Natal is in turmoil. Due to the care of cancer patients being 
compromised, the liability of public health officials is in question. Curable cancers have 
 
1 E Lotriet ‘Bleeding Oncology Dry’ (2017) (17) 6 The Specialist Forum, 4-4. 
2 Lortiet op cit (2017) Volume 17 Number (6) 4. 
3 South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) Investigative Report in to complaint by Dr. Imran Keeka 
relating to both shortages of staff and a lack of functional health technology machines for screening, 
diagnosing and treating cancer in the KwaZulu-Natal Province (KZN Province) (2017) 4. 
4 The Department of Health, KwaZulu-Natal, The MEC: Department of Health, KwaZulu-Natal, Addington 
Hospital and Inkosi Albert Luthuli Central Hospital. 
5 SAHRC Investigative Report op cit (note 3) 64-67. 
6 ‘Oncology machines and staff still lacking in KZN – DA’ News24 Online, 17 January 2018 accessed from 
https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/oncology-machines-and-staff-still-lacking-in-kzn-da-20180117, 
(accessed on 28 March 2018). 
7 Ibid.  
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become terminal due to delayed treatment or no treatment at all. In addition to this, a lack of 
oncologists due to poor working conditions are amongst the concerns.  
This research examines the oncology crisis in KwaZulu-Natal during 2015-2017, to evaluate 
the liability of public health officials in the KwaZulu-Natal Health Department, focusing on 
the impact of deteriorating oncology care for women living with cervical cancer during 2015-
2017. Furthermore, the research suggests possible civil remedies which are available to the 
survivors of cervical cancer during this period. It is important to note that this research only 
considers harm suffered ,as well as, the waiting periods for treatment, during the period 2015-
2017.  
 
1.2    Literature Critique  
Due to the topical nature of this research, there is limited academic and peer-reviewed 
literature available. As a result, the research will rely heavily on newspaper articles and other 
forums of current news to gather data on the research area.  
The following review attempts to provide an understanding of the literature that is available 
on the oncology crisis during 2015-2017. It further highlights the gap in literature, that this 
research aims to cover here.  
1.2.1  Current State of oncology care in KZN 
Writing for The Specialist Forum Journal8, Lotriet discusses the lack of oncology staff, 
including oncologists in KZN.9 The article highlights that there are currently two oncologists 
in Pietermaritzburg and no oncologists in Durban - KZN’s largest city.10 This dilemma forces 
oncology patients to relocate so that they receive oncology treatment, or face the reality of 
death.11 This position was emphasized by Dr. Mvyisi Mzukwa, the spokesman and chairman 
of the SA Medical Association in KZN. The crisis has built up over a period of time, says 
Noel Desfontaines the Health and Other Service Personnel Trade Union of South Africa 
General Secretary, who claimed that the Public Health sector in KZN has been on the brink 
of collapse for many years. Further, lack of staff can be attributed to the working conditions, 
because such working conditions in the public sector are untenable. 12  
Inoperative oncology machines, ineffective referral systems and corruption scandals are 
amongst the issues that have led to the deteriorating state of oncology care.13 It is submitted 
that Lotriet describes the views of individuals who hold senior positions in the Health Sector, 
and whose opinions carry weight and will add value to this research. 
 
8 ‘The Specialist Forum is a monthly journal for all medical specialists. Our content is sourced from key opinion 
leaders as well as international peer-reviewed journals. Articles focus on the latest developments in medical 
treatment and diagnostics’, available at https://journals.co.za/content/journal/nm_specf (accessed on 27 April 
2018). 
9 Lotriet, E ‘Bleeding Oncology Dry’ (2017) 17 Number 6 The Specialist Forum, 4-4. 
10 Lotriet op cit 4-4. 
11 Lotriet op cit 4-4. 
12 Lotriet op cit 4-4. 
13 Lotriet op cit 4-4. 
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In an account of the investigations conducted by the SAHRC14 into two health institutions in 
Durban, the commission has found that the KZN Health Department, the MEC of the KZN 
Health Department and other public health officials have violated oncology patients’ right of 
access to health care services, by their failure to comply with national legislation and 
policy.15 
The above public officials have failed to evaluate the need for functional oncology equipment 
within a reasonable period, and have failed to procure alternative equipment for treatment 
programmes.16 The report further notes that the KZN health authorities have not retained or 
recruited oncology staff and specialist oncologists, and have failed to properly determine the 
health needs of oncology patients or to put in place interim measures including sufficient 
public-private partnerships.17 
1.2.2   Disproportionate effect on cervical cancer patients 
The oncology crisis during 2015-2017 has had a disproportionate effect on oncology patients 
diagnosed with cervical cancer. This is because ‘unlike other diseases cervical cancer is 
preventable and remains the most common cause of cancer deaths in women in KZN’.18 
Cervical cancer has been the second leading cancer in women of KZN states Lorraine 
Govender, who is the National Advocacy Co-ordinator for the Cancer Association of South 
Africa19 (CANSA).20 Govender also notes that cervical cancer has the highest morality rates 
nationwide.21 This observation was confirmed by the KZN Health MEC – Dr. Sibongiseni 
Dhlomo who provided that cervical cancer featured amongst the top five cancers prevalent in 
KZN.22 
During the investigations into the KZN health department and health institutions23, vulnerable 
women diagnosed with cancer were provided an opportunity to share their experience with 
the KZN health care system. One such woman who remained anonymous (Patient 1) gave an 
account of her diagnosis with cervical cancer in June 2015, that required both chemotherapy 
and radiotherapy treatment.24 However, due to inoperative machines which should have 
provided both these treatments at the Inkosi Albert Luthuli Central Hospital, she was 
 
14 ‘The South African Human Rights Commission is the national institution established to support constitutional 
democracy. It is committed to promote respect for, observance of and protection of human rights for 
everyone without fear or favour’ available at https://www.sahrc.org.za/index.php/about-us/about-the-sahrc 
(accessed on 27 April 2018). 
15 SAHRC Investigative Report op cit (note 3), 64. 
16 SAHRC Investigative Report op cit (note 3), 64. 
17 SAHRC Investigative Report op cit (note 3), 64. 
18 ‘KZN GETS 15 CERVICAL CANCER MACHINES AMID ONCOLOGY CRISIS’ EYEWITNESS NEWS, 5 April 2018 
available at http://ewn.co.za/2018/04/04/kzn-gets-15-cervical-cancer-machines-amid-oncology-crisis 
(accessed on 21 April 2018). 
19 ‘A leader in the fight against cancer in SA, the purpose of the Cancer Association of South Africa (CANSA), is 
to offer a unique, integrated service to the public and to all people affected by cancer’ available from 
http://www.cansa.org.za/cansas-unique-role-service-delivery/ (accessed on 27 April 2018). 
20 ‘More Oncologists, hope for KZN’ Independent Online, 17 February 2018 available from 
https://www.iol.co.za/ios/news/more-oncologists-hope-for-kzn-cancer-patients-13331307 (accessed on 18 
April 2018).  
21 ‘More Oncologists, hope for KZN’ Independent Online op cit. 
22 ‘More Oncologists, hope for KZN’ Independent Online op cit. 
23 Addington Hospital and Inkosi Albert Luthuli Central Hospital. 
24 SAHRC Investigative Report op cit (note 3), 31. 
 
4 
 
informed that there would be a waiting period and would have only received radiotherapy 
treatment in December 2016.25 Further, in December 2016 her treatment was interrupted for 
three days due to the machine undergoing service.26 
The Bhekisisa Centre for Health Journalism27, gave an account of a woman diagnosed with 
cervical cancer, Ms. Sibiya. Ms. Sibiya’s appointments were delayed because of broken 
oncology machines, and her last admission to the hospital saw her wait hours for a doctor’s 
consultation, only to receive more pain killers and no treatment for her cancer. 28 As a result 
of the disproportionate effect on women, this dissertation will focus on cervical cancer 
patients.  
1.2.3    Liability of KZN Health Department and other public health officials  
The Medical Rights Advocacy Network (MeRAN), a grouping of bioethicists and other 
medical experts, believe that public health officials who have violated the rights of oncology 
patients should be charged with culpable homicide, at the very least, for those patients who 
have died due to the crisis.29 
McQuoid-Mason, argues that the KZN Health MEC and other public health officials were 
negligent in failing to ensure that oncology equipment was serviced and intentionally 
awarded a service contract to an unauthorised service provider.30 This has resulted in the 
oncology machines remaining inoperative with the consequence that patients did not receive 
treatment, which has led to delayed treatment and even deaths. 31 McQuoid-Mason has also 
explained the criminal offences that health officials can be found guilty of. 
McQuoid-Mason, further argues that public health officials may be held personally liable for 
harm caused to patients, resulting from their indifference, maladministration or negligent 
conduct.32 Departments are sued, and employees escape liability due to the principle of 
vicarious liability. 33However, McQuoid-Mason argues that instead irresponsible public 
 
25 SAHRC Investigative Report op cit (note 3), 31. 
26 SAHRC Investigative Report op cit (note 3), 31 – Unfortunately, the stage of Patient 1’s cancer is not 
mentioned in the interview.  
27 ‘Bhekisisa is currently the M&G’s largest specialist editorial desk. It has seven full-time staff members, 
including a director/editor, news editor, senior multimedia journalist and three health journalists. Bhekisisa 
also has a part-time Africa editor and monitoring and evaluation specialist’ available at 
http://bhekisisa.org/page/about-us/ accessed on 27 April 2018. 
28 ‘KZN cancer patients sent home with panados as treatment waiting lists grow’ Mail and Guardian Online 
Bhekisisa Centre for Health Journalism, 21 September 2017 available at http://bhekisisa.org/article/2017-09-
21-the-malignant-province-kzn-and-the-unbearable-wait-to-die, (accessed on 22 February 2018). – This report 
does not mention if Ms. Sibiya’s cancer was terminal.  
29 ‘Fighting the cancer of corruption’ The Mercury 28 March 2018, at 9.  
30 McQuoid-Mason DJ, ‘Public health officials and MECs for health should be held criminally liable for causing 
the death of cancer patients through their intentional or negligent conduct that results in oncology equipment 
not working in hospitals’ (2017) 10 No. 2 The South African Journal of Bioethics and Law (SAJBL), 83.  
31 McQuoid-Mason op cit, 83. 
32 McQuoid-Mason DJ, ‘Public health officials and MECs should be held liable for harm caused to patients 
through incompetence, indifference, maladministration or negligence regarding the availability of hospital 
equipment’ (2016) 106 No. 7 The South African Medical Journal (SAMJ), 681. 
33 ‘Vicarious liability may in general terms be defined as the strict liability of one person for the delict of 
another’ available at http://www.dejure.up.ac.za/index.php/volumes/45-vol-2-2012/106-article-1.html c.f. 
Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Law of Delict (2010) 365. 
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officials should be sued in their personal capacity.34 The state however, can also be held 
vicariously liable and make payment.35 Where an individual official cannot afford to pay 
compensation, and in the case of more than one health official being liable, the damages may 
be apportioned amongst them.36 
This article is beneficial for the research as it illustrates that those officials directly liable for 
the oncology crisis, may be held accountable. This approach will prevent future negligence 
by health officials, because of the possibility of personal liability for damages.  
In the case of N v MEC for Health, Gauteng37, the MEC denied all allegations brought by the 
plaintiff, against the Department of Health in Gauteng for a malpractice suit. Due to the 
insistent denial by the MEC, the court ordered that the he is liable for costs and damages in 
both his representative and personal capacity.38 This case demonstrates how an MEC may be 
held personally liable for costs and damages owing to the way he approached the matter. 
The literature available on the oncology crisis in KZN provides a general overview of 
oncology care in the public health sector and the possible criminal liability of health officials 
for oncology-related deaths due to the crisis. It also recommends personal liability for health 
officials for the harm caused to oncology patients.  
However, the impact of the oncology crisis during 2015-2017 on surviving cervical cancer 
patients, (who are one of the most affected groups), and the possible civil remedies available 
to them, have not yet been addressed. This dissertation aims to investigate the issue by 
updating the scholarly literature on the issue and provide appropriate recommendations. 
 
1.3    Research Questions  
1. What caused the oncology crisis in Kwa Zulu-Natal during 2015 – 2017 ? 
2. What constitutional rights of cervical cancer patients have been violated ? 
3. What steps have been taken by the KZN Health Department during the period 2015 – 
2017 to address the oncology crisis ? 
4. What civil remedies are available to the cervical cancer survivors or their families for 
the lack of oncology services during 2015-2017 ? 
5. Who can be sued for these civil remedies, brought by cervical cancer patients or their 
dependents ? 
6. Conclusion – Appropriate recommendations ? 
 
 
34 McQuoid-Mason op cit 681. 
35 McQuoid-Mason DJ, ‘Public health officials and MECs should be held liable for harm caused to patients 
through incompetence, indifference, maladministration or negligence regarding the availability of hospital 
equipment’ (2016) 106 No. 7 The South African Medical Journal (SAMJ), 682 
36 McQuoid-Mason op cit, 682. 
37 N v MEC for Health, Gauteng (2015) ZAGPPHC 645. 
38 N v MEC for Health supra. 
 
6 
 
 
1.4 Aim of research  
The objective of this study is to analyse the impact of the oncology crisis during 2015 – 2017 
in Kwa Zulu-Natal on cervical cancer patients, to determine which constitutional rights have 
been violated, and whether the actions by public officials in the Kwa Zulu-Natal Health 
Department were unethical.  
The crisis in Kwa Zulu-Natal is an ongoing phenomenon. Oncology machines are still out of 
order, and there is still a lack of oncology staff including specialist oncologists. 39 Owing to 
the shortage in machinery and staff, treatment has been delayed for lengthy periods of time 
and the failure to provide proper health care services has resulted in patient deaths.40 
Many of the delayed treatments has led to the deaths of women who have been diagnosed 
with cervical cancer. This should be viewed against the backdrop that globally, cervical 
cancer is the second most common cancer in women and is mostly prevalent in low and 
middle-income countries41, like South Africa.  
In addition, The International Agency for Research on Cancer42 estimates that cervical cancer 
is predominantly caused by the sexually transmitted disease – human papillomavirus (HPV), 
and is the leading cause of cancer deaths in women of South Africa.43 HPV is one of the most 
prevalent sexually transmitted viruses.44 A first time study in a rural setting of South Africa 
has determined that the prevalence of HPV was 70.5 %, with more than 100 types of the virus 
identified, of which eighteen types have been associated with cervical cancer. HPV 16 and 
 
39 Op cit (note 6). 
40 DJ McQuoid-Mason, ‘Public health officials and MECs for health should be held criminally liable for causing 
the death of cancer patients through their intentional or negligent conduct that results in oncology equipment 
not working in hospitals’ (2017) 10 (2) SAJBL, 83. 
41 C J Chibwesha et al. ‘Estimating the burden of cervical disease among HIV-infected women accessing 
screening services in South Africa: A model-based analysis’ (2018) 108(3) SAMJ, 235. 
42 ‘The International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) is the specialized cancer agency of the World Health 
Organization. The objective of the IARC is to promote international collaboration in cancer research. The 
Agency is inter-disciplinary, bringing together skills in epidemiology, laboratory sciences and biostatistics to 
identify the causes of cancer so that preventive measures may be adopted and the burden of disease and 
associated suffering reduced. A significant feature of the IARC is its expertise in coordinating research across 
countries and organizations; its independent role as an international organization facilitates this activity. The 
Agency has a particular interest in conducting research in low and middle-income countries through 
partnerships and collaborations with researchers in these regions’ available at 
https://www.iarc.fr/en/about/index.php (accessed on 1 May 2018). 
43 ‘KZN cancer patients sent home with panados as treatment waiting lists grow’ Mail and Guardian Online 
Bhekisisa Centre for Health Journalism, 21 September 2017 available at http://bhekisisa.org/article/2017-09-
21-the-malignant-province-kzn-and-the-unbearable-wait-to-die, (accessed on 22 February 2018). 
44 World Health Organization ‘Human papillomavirus and HPV vaccines: Technical information for policy-
makers and health professionals’ (2007)  Munoz N et al. ‘Epidemiologic classification of human papillomavirus 
types associated with cervical cancer’ New England Journal of Medicine (2003) c.f. Ebrahim S et al. (2016) ‘High 
Burden of Human Papillomavirus (HPV) Infection among Young Women in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa’ PLoS 
ONE, 19 January 2016 available at https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0146603, accessed on 2 April 2018. 
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HPV 18 are high-risk/oncogenic types which are linked with the development of cervical 
cancer. 45 
The state of oncology care in Kwa Zulu-Natal also constitutes violations of patient’s 
constitutional rights, as highlighted in the SAHRC Report. The report investigated two health 
institutions46 in Durban, both of which have specialised oncology units. The commission 
found that the cervical cancer patients’ constitutional rights of access to health care47, human 
dignity48 and to life49 have been violated. 50 
 
1.5 Research Methodology  
This research will use qualitative methods in the form of desktop research. The various 
sources of data include: The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, legislation, 
policy, regulations, common law, legal ethics, international law instruments, newspaper 
articles, journal articles and an investigative report by the South African Human Rights 
Commission.  
The application of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa on the oncology crisis in 
Kwa Zulu-Natal will be examined. The relevant sections provide that every person has the 
right of access to health care services51 and the right to dignity52. The constitution also 
imposes the obligation on the state to uphold these rights.53 
The law that was passed54 to realise the constitutional right of access to health care55 is the 
National Health Act.56 The Act, which is applicable to all levels of government, relates to 
health care services and other connected matters.57 
Using the law of delict in South Africa, the following civil remedies will be investigated in 
this research: damages, mandamus interdict, including structural interdicts.  
 
45 Ebrahim S et al. (2016) ‘High Burden of Human Papillomavirus (HPV) Infection among Young Women in 
KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa’ PLoS ONE, 19 January 2016 available at 
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0146603, (accessed on 2 April 2018).  
46 Addington Hospital and Inkosi Albert Luthuli Central Hospital. 
47 S27 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
48 Constitution of 1996 (note 16 above) Section 10. 
49 Constitution of 1996 (note 16 above) Section 11. 
50 SAHRC Investigative Report op cit (note 3), 64. 
51Constitution of 1996 Ibid (note 16 above). 
52 Constitution of 1996 (note 16 above) Section 10. 
53 Constitution of 1996 (note 16 above) Section 7(2). 
54 Constitution of 1996 (note 16 above) Section 27(2). 
55 Constitution of 1996 (note 16 above) Section 27(1). 
56 The National Health Act 61 of 2003. 
57 Preamble of The National Health Act 61 of 2003. 
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Case law will be used investigate aspects of socio-economic rights.58 The elements relevant 
to this research include the meaning of ‘reasonableness’59, ‘progressive realisation’60 and the 
relationship of the right of access to health care with the constitutional rights of human 
dignity and to life.61 
This research will also investigate the policies62 and regulations63 that are applicable to the 
health sector. Under national policy the preamble to the National Core Standards reads that 
‘The National Core Standards for Health Establishments have been expressly created as a 
statement of what is expected, and required, to deliver decent, safe, (sic)quality care’.64 
Further, the National Policy on Quality in Healthcare provides for units in each provincial 
department which are required to manage quality assurance, quality improvement and to 
provide continuous monitoring of compliance with standards to ensure quality health care.65 
Under the health regulations in South Africa, regulation 4 of the Norms and Standards 
Regulations66 states that ‘the purpose of the regulations is to guide, monitor and enforce the 
control of critical risks to the health and safety of users by means of the required systems and 
relevant supportive structures within different categories of health establishments, so to 
provide safe quality services to the citizens’. 
It will also analyse international law instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights67, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights68,The African 
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights69, The World Health Organisation (WHO) and the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) General Comment on the 
Right to Health (General Comment 14), all of which describe the universal norms and 
standards of health care. These must be considered when interpreting the right of access to 
health care services.70 
 
58 South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) ‘Investigative Report in to complaint by Dr. Imran Keeka 
relating to both shortages of staff and a lack of functional health technology machines for screening, 
diagnosing and treating cancer in the Kwa Zulu-Natal Province (KZN Province)’ (2017), 46. 
59 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others (CCTI 1100) 
[2000] ZACC 19; 2001 (1) SA 46; 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (4 October 2000). 
60 Grootboom supra, at para 46. 
61 Khosa and Others v Minister of Social Development and Others, Mahlaule and Another v Minister of Social 
Development (CCT 13/03, CCT 12/03) [2004] ZACC 1 1 ; 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC); 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC) (4 March 
2004). 
62 National Policy on Quality in Healthcare (2007) (National Policy); National Core Standards for Health 
Establishment in South Africa (2011) (National Core Standards). 
63Norms and Standards Regulations in terms of Section 90 (1)(b) and (c) of the National Health Act, 61 of 2003, 
Applicable to Certain Categories of Health Establishments No. R. 109 (18 February 2015).  
64 Preamble of The National Core Standards for Health Establishment in South Africa (2011). 
65 SAHRC Investigative Report op cit (note 3), 40-41. 
66  Norms and Standards Regulations in terms of Section 90 (1)(b) and (c) of the National Health Act, 61 of 
2003, Applicable to Certain Categories of Health Establishments No. R. 109 (18 February 2015). 
67 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948. 
68 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Right, 1976. 
69 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, 1986. 
70 Constitution of 1996 (note 16 above) Section 39(1)(b). 
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Lastly, ethical guidelines such as in the Health Professions Council of South Africa71 
(HPCSA), that provide ethical rules and guidelines for good practice will be referred to. 
These include the Ethical and Professional Rules of The Health Professions Council of South 
Africa as promulgated in Government Gazette R717/200672, General Ethical Guidelines for 
Health Professions73, The National Patients’ Rights Charter74, and the General Ethical 
Guidelines for Reproductive Health.75 
 
1.6    Outline of chapters  
This research paper begins by setting out the background of the oncology crisis, and the 
objective, need and method of this research, in chapter one. 
Chapter two details the constitutional right violations of cancer patients due to the oncology 
crisis. These violations have been investigated and confirmed by the SAHRC. 
Chapter three then goes on to set out and comment on the various sources of national and 
international law which exists as the South African legal framework, in relation to the right of 
access to health care services. 
Chapter four of the research paper provides the possible civil remedies that are available in 
the law of delict, to those cervical cancer patients who have suffered harm during the 
oncology crisis.  
Furthermore, this chapter will analyse the appropriateness of the remedies in the context of 
the oncology crisis. Finally, it will investigate the procedures used to bring restitution to 
victims of other health crises, in order to determine the effectiveness of the procedures for 
those cervical cancer patients who have suffered harm, during the oncology crisis in KZN. 
Chapter five of the research paper identifies the public officials who may be sued for harm 
caused to cervical cancer patients and their families, during the oncology crisis from 2015 – 
2017. 
Chapter six concludes the research paper by making appropriate recommendations regarding 
the relief available to cervical cancer patients, who suffered harm during the oncology crisis 
in KZN. 
 
 
71 ‘The HPCSA, in conjunction with its 12 Professional Boards, is committed to promoting the health of the 
population, determining standards of professional education and training, and setting and maintaining 
excellent standards of ethical and professional practice’ available at http://www.hpcsa.co.za/About (accessed 
on 2 May 2018).  
72 Health Professions Council of South Africa. Guidelines for Good Practice in the Healthcare Professions. 
Booklet 2. Ethical and Professional Rules of The Health Professions Council of South Africa as promulgated in 
Government Gazette (2007). 
73 Health Professions Council of South Africa. Guidelines for Good Practice in the Healthcare Professions. 
Booklet 1. General Ethical Guidelines for Health Professions (2016). 
74 Health Professions Council of South Africa. Guidelines for Good Practice in the Healthcare Professions. 
Booklet 3. National Patients’ Rights Charter (2016). 
75 Health Professions Council of South Africa. Guidelines for Good Practice in the Healthcare Professions. 
Booklet 8. General Ethical Guidelines for Reproductive Health (2016).  
 
10 
 
1.7    Conclusion  
The chapter provided an overview of the oncology crisis in KZN during the period 2015-
2017. It highlighted some of the challenges of the oncology crisis that have been brought to 
light, following investigations conducted by the SAHRC. It also examined the 
disproportionate effect of the oncology crisis on cervical cancer patients who are a vulnerable 
group in society, as well as the need for vindicating their constitutional rights. 
This chapter then went on to provide a literature critique on the scholarly articles that are 
available on the oncology crisis, further, an objective is provided for the purpose of this 
research.  
In addition, the methods of research used in this dissertation are explored and the outline for 
each of the following chapters are detailed. 
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CHAPTER TWO : CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS AND FINDINGS OF THE 
SOUTH AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISION ON THE ONCOLOGY CRISIS. 
 
2.1    Constitutional violations  
The right of access to health services is provided in section 27 of the Constitution, which 
forms part of the Bill of Rights in South Africa.76 Section 27(2) states that reasonable 
legislative and other measures must be taken by the state, within the available resources of 
the state.77 These measures must progressively realise the right of access to health care.78 The 
constitutional right of access to health care further states that no person may be refused 
emergency medical treatment.79 However, children have a stronger health right provided by 
the Constitution, which states that each child has a right to basic health care services.80 This 
means that children are entitled to receive basic health care and not just the right to have 
access to these services. 
In addition, the right to dignity is afforded to every person by their inherent virtue of being 
human.81 Therefore, every person has the right to have their dignity respected and protected.82 
Section 11 of the Constitution further provides that every person has the right to life.83 It also 
notes that there is a constitutional obligation on the state to ‘respect, protect, promote and 
fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights’.84 
Lastly, the Constitution grants legislative competence to both the national and provincial 
government, and lists ‘health services’ as an area of concurrent legislative power, which 
enables both levels of government to exercise this power.85 This means that both the national 
and provincial government must work in collaboration, regarding issues relating to health 
services.86 This includes working together to create strategies, that address provincial health 
care challenges such like the oncology crisis.87 
 
2.2   Determining the reasonableness of actions by public health officials 
As previously mentioned, the SAHRC was tasked to make a determination regarding the 
complaint put before it by Democratic Alliance MPL, Dr Imran Keeka.88 The Commission 
had to decide on the reasonableness of the measures taken by the KwaZulu-Natal Health 
 
76 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996 Section 27(1)(a). 
77 The Constitution (note 32) Section 27(2). 
78 Ibid. 
79 The Constitution (note 32) Section 27(3). 
80 The Constitution (note 32) Section 28(1)(c). 
81 The Constitution (note 32) Section 10. 
82 Ibid. 
83 The Constitution (note 32) Section 11. 
84 The Constitution (note 32) Section 7(2).  
85 The Constitution (note 32) Schedule 4 Part A. 
86 SAHRC Investigative Report op cit (note 3) 35. 
87 Ibid.  
88 SAHRC Investigative Report op cit (note 3) 50. 
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Department, in their efforts to manage the oncology crisis. This determination also had to be 
made within the meaning and context of section 27 of the Constitution.89 
The Commission had to make a finding as to whether the alleged shortage of oncologists, 
shortage of oncology staff, and the delay in provision of treatment to oncology patients, 
constituted a violation of the right of access to health care services.90 
 
2.3    Findings of the SAHRC 
Factual and evidentiary findings were used during the Commission’s investigation to 
determine if the actions of the KZN Health Department, or the lack thereof, violated the right 
of access to health care.91 The findings of the SAHRC’s investigation included: 
▪ A shortage of oncologists and oncology trained nursing staff in public hospitals, 
specifically at Inkosi Albert Luthuli Central and Addington Hospitals in KZN.92 
▪ A lack of available functional equipment to diagnose, treat and screen cancer, which 
includes VRALA (Varian Rapid Arc Linear Accelerator) machines used for 
radiotherapy treatment and CT scanners.93 
▪ A backlog of patients awaiting oncology services.94 
▪ Delay in provision of oncology services at Inkosi Albert Luthuli Hospital and 
Addington Hospital.95 
▪ Waiting periods for treatment and screening appointments that exceed 6 months.96 
As previously mentioned, there is an obligation on the state to realise and promote the rights 
contained in the Bill of rights.97 This obligation was given further interpretation by the 
Constitutional Court in the Grootboom case,98 where the Constitutional court underlined that 
in relation to socio-economic rights, mere legislation is insufficient to realise this category of 
rights.99 Legislation has to be supported by suitable policy measures and programmes 
implemented by the Executive, so that the state complies with its constitutional duties and the 
intended result of such rights.100 
 
89 Ibid.  
90 SAHRC Investigative Report op cit (note 3) 50. 
91 Ibid.  
92 SAHRC Investigative Report op cit (note 3) 51 – The then head of the KZN Health Department, Dr Sifiso 
Mtshali, alleges in a written response to the commission dated 11/05/17 that the major challenge is the lack of 
trained doctors and not the unavailability of functional oncology equipment. He also alleges in a response 
dated 25/05/17, that the public sector has been losing oncologists to the private sector long before the crisis 
begun in Addington Hospital. He states that is it not possible to provide any oncology services without the 
appropriately trained specialists.  
93 SAHRC Investigative Report op cit (note 3) 51. 
94 Ibid.  
95 Ibid. 
96 Ibid. 
97 The Constitution (note 32) Section 7(2). 
98 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2000 ZACC 19. 
99 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others supra at 54 para 33. 
100 Ibid. 
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An earlier report by the SAHRC on ‘Public Hearings into the Right of Access to Health 
Services’,101 noted that the legislative and policy measures in South Africa, do conform to the 
international standards regarding the right of access to health care services.102 It further noted 
that what is needed in the South African context of the right of access to health care services, 
is proper implementation of the measures that are in place.103  
Investigations conducted by the SAHRC have revealed that oncology patients were subjected 
to delays in their treatment of more than 6 months in all the cases that the Commission 
became aware of through interviews with patients, and information by staff of Inkosi Albert 
Luthuli Central Hospital.104 As a result of such delays in the provision of treatment, it is 
highly probable that oncology patients’ right of access to health care services have been 
denied, due to poor implementation of health policy measures.105 
Despite the legislative and policy measures in place in South Africa that meet the 
constitutional standard of reasonableness, the SAHRC found that the implementation of these 
measures by the KZN health sector, cannot be deemed to have met the reasonableness 
standard.106 
 
2.4    The shortage of oncology staff and oncology machines in KZN  
Following the investigations conducted by the SAHRC, it became apparent to the 
commission that the shortage of both oncology staff and machines has been a continuous 
problem in KZN, including at the Addington and Inkosi Albert Luthuli hospitals.107  
The SAHRC was also unable to establish whether the Management Plan in place to ensure 
access to health services, had ever been evaluated in accordance with section 25(2) of the 
National Health Act since its implementation.108 Further, it was not clear to the Commission 
if the KZN Health Department had evaluated whether the level of care set out in the 
Management Plan was sufficient to meet the current demands of the oncology crisis in 
KZN.109 
The SAHRC noted that the patient referral system at Inkosi Albert Luthutli Hospital, arising 
from the shortage of oncologists and machines at Addington and King Edward hospitals, had 
created another backlog of patients awaiting oncology services.110 This new backlog added to 
the delay of oncology services, including possible lifesaving treatment.111 
 
101 South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) A report and recommendations based on the submissions 
and proceedings of the Public Hearings conducted at the national office of the South African Human Rights 
Commission, Parktown, Johannesburg from 30 May to 1 June 2007 accessed from 
https://www.sahrc.org.za/home/21/files/Health%20Report.pdf (accessed on 6 August 2018). 
102 SAHRC Public Hearings Report op cit (note 57) c.f. SAHRC Investigative Report op cit (note 3) 53. 
103 SAHRC Public Hearings Report op cit (note 57). 
104 SAHRC Investigative Report op cit (note 3) 53. 
105 Ibid. 
106 Ibid. 
107 SAHRC Investigative Report op cit (note 3) 54. 
108 Ibid. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Ibid. 
111 Ibid. 
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Through numerous interviews conducted by the SAHRC, it was established that the 
rescheduling of oncology patient appointments which had caused delay112 in treatment, was a 
result of non-functioning machines and a lack of oncologists.113 An increase in the prevalence 
of cancer patients in the KZN province, may also be recognised as a contributing factor in the 
demand for oncology services.114 
Plans by the KZN Health Department to direct resources in aiding with patients treatment 
which had been backlogged at Inkosi Albert Luthuli Hospital, and other oncology units at 
state facilities in KZN, did not provide adequate remedy to lessening the crisis of the 
department’s oncology services.115 The plan merely created new backlogs and denied 
oncology services to new oncology patients, which the SAHRC described as ‘unacceptable’ 
and a further continuation of the ‘crisis mode’.116 
The interviews revealed that the service management agreements in place for oncology 
machines were not effective, since the CT scanners broke down frequently.117 This hindered 
early diagnosis and treatment, which the World Health Organisation (WHO) has set 
guidelines concerning cancer diagnosis and treatment as follows: 
‘diagnosing cancer in the late stages, and the inability to provide treatment, 
condemns many people to unnecessary suffering and early death...by taking 
steps to implement WHO’s new guidance, healthcare planning can improve 
early diagnosis of cancer and ensure prompt treatment. This will result in 
more people surviving cancer. It will also be less expensive to treat and cure 
cancer patients’118 
The long waiting periods for treatment and hospital transfers have had an adverse impact on 
diagnosis and treatment of cervical cancer, since re-diagnosis and extra appointments are 
needed when a patient eventually gets to see an oncologist on a delayed appointment date.119 
This backlog also negatively affected the working environment where staff were expected to 
work demanding hours, with limited human resources and equipment.120 These conditions 
have forced staff to move away from the public sector, into the private sector.121 
The reason for the shortage of functional oncology machines given by the KZN Health 
Department, on 8 June 2016 to the SAHRC, was contractual disputes with the service 
provider tasked with maintaining the oncology machines.122 Resource constraints have never 
been mentioned as a factor in relation to the shortage on oncology machines.123 
 
112 SAHRC Investigative Report op cit (note 3) 55 – An average waiting period of 5 months for an oncologist 
consultation, and further 8 months before receiving any radiotherapy treatment. 
113 SAHRC Investigative Report op cit (note 3) 55. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Ibid. 
117 Ibid. 
118 Accessed from http://www.who.int/en/news-room/detail/03-02-2017-early-cancer-diagnosis-saves-lives-
cuts-treatment-costs c.f. SAHRC Investigative Report op cit (note 3) 56. 
119 SAHRC Investigative Report op cit (note 3) 56 
120 Ibid. 
121 Ibid. 
122 SAHRC Investigative Report op cit (note 3) 57. 
123 Ibid. 
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The report by the SAHRC states that the denial and the delay of oncology services to 
patients, including those with life-threatening conditions, was a violation of their right to 
human dignity and their right to life.124 Further, the denial and delay of treatment denied 
oncology patients the ability to enjoy other fundamental rights, due to their health being 
poor.125 
The constitutional right to human dignity was interpreted by the courts in Dawood and 
another v Minister of Home Affairs,126 where the courts explained that it is a right that must 
be respected and promoted, and is an enforceable value that usually informs the interpretation 
of other rights contained in the Constitution.127 The SAHRC reports that an oncology 
patient’s right to human dignity and to life is non-negotiable, and that it is the responsibility 
of the KZN Health Department to provide access to health care, while promoting and 
maintaining the standards for health care set out by the National Health Act.128 However, the 
failure to retain and recruit oncology staff does not meet this standard.129 The Commission 
considered this failure as an ineffectual effort to provide access to health care services, as set 
out by the National Health Act.130 
Poor referral systems have done little to act as interim measures for public health care users, 
in aiding to effectively manage the oncology crisis.131 The SAHRC emphasises that since the 
respondents were fully aware of the shortfalls in the provision of oncology services, their 
duty was at the very least, to take reasonable steps through recruitment of staff and 
management of an effective screening, diagnosis and treatment procedure for oncology 
patients in KwaZulu-Natal.132 
Further the SAHRC points out that the shortage of oncology staff and specialists equally 
contributed to the deterioration of public oncology services, which had been evident in this 
crisis.133 It is submitted that even where machines are available, it is not a solution if there are 
no oncology staff to properly operate such machines which treat, scan and diagnose oncology 
patients. 
The SAHRC concluded that the respondents failed in taking reasonable measures, to ensure 
that human and technological resources were in place for the proper standard of care for 
oncology patients.134 Accordingly, the KZN Health Department has failed to progressively 
realise the right of access to health care services in accordance with the spirit and purport of 
the National Health Act and the Constitution.135 
 
 
124 SAHRC Investigative Report op cit (note 3) 58. 
125 Ibid. 
126 Dawood and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others ; Shalabi and Another v Minister of Home 
Affairs and Others ; Thomas and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others 2000 (3) SA 936 (CC). 
127 Dawood and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others supra at 82 para 17. 
128 SAHRC Investigative Report op cit (note 3) 58. 
129 SAHRC Investigative Report op cit (note 3) 59. 
130 Ibid. 
131 Ibid. 
132 Ibid. 
133 Ibid. 
134 SAHRC Investigative Report op cit (note 3) 61. 
135 SAHRC Investigative Report op cit (note 3) 61-62. 
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2.5    Steps taken thus far by the SAHRC 
There has been written correspondence between the SAHRC and the KZN Health 
Department regarding the report.136 The correspondence was initiated by the Commission for 
its preliminary investigative report, on 24 April 2017.137 The only party to send a response to 
the commission was the KZN Department of Health on 25 May 2017, where it commented on 
the preliminary report.138 
The SAHRC then sent out a written response to the KZN Health Department, on 4 May 2017. 
The letter listed the allegations brought against the department and provided an opportunity 
for them to reply to the allegations.139 The KZN Health Department sent out their responses 
in correspondence to the commission, on 8 June 2017.140 
Following the written responses, inspections in loco were conducted at Addington Hospital 
and Inkosi Albert Luthuli Central Hospital.141 The SAHRC conducted site investigations at 
both hospitals, and interviews with staff and patients at Inkosi Albert Luthuli Hospital.142 
After several calls for the KZN Department of Health to comply with the recommendations 
given by SAHRC following the above-mentioned investigations, the Commission conducted 
a hearing on 14 May 2018 at its Head Office in Braamfontein where the media were invited 
to attend. The MEC for Health, Dr. Dhlomo, was subpoenaed by the SAHRC to account for 
the ‘lack of progress’ made, following their Report.143 At the hearing Dr Dhlomo reported 
that there were 349 deaths at Inkosi Albert Luthuli Central Hospital, and 150 deaths at Greys 
Hospital in Pietermaritzburg, KZN.144 This total of 499 deaths from all cancers, were only 
those recorded at the mentioned hospitals, and excludes home/care facility deaths of 
oncology patients.145 It was also noted at the hearing that the waiting period for treatment had 
been increased to as long as 12 months.146 Dr Keeka, who laid the initial compliant to the 
SAHRC, stated that Dr. Dhlomo should ‘not escape justice for his uncaring and lethargic 
response which has led to the deaths of possibly more than 500 cancer patients, as a result of 
 
136 SAHRC Investigative Report op cit (note 3) 5. 
137 Ibid. 
138 SAHRC Investigative Report op cit (note 3) 6. 
139 SAHRC Investigative Report op cit (note 3) 7. 
140 Ibid. 
141 SAHRC Investigative Report op cit (note 3), 19-28. 
142 SAHRC Investigative Report op cit (note 3), 29-34. 
143 ‘Media Statement: MEC of Health, KwaZulu-Natal, Hon. Dr Sibongiseni Dhlomo, to  
Appear before SAHRC in Subpoena hearing on Oncology Crisis’ 11 May 2018 accessed from 
https://www.sahrc.org.za/index.php/sahrc-media/news-2/item/1326-media-statement-mec-of-health-
kwazulu-natal-hon-dr-sibongiseni-dhlomo-to-appear-before-sahrc-in-subpoena-hearing-on-oncology-crisis 
(accessed on 12 May 2018).  
144 Imran Keeka ‘#KZNOncologyCrisis: SAHRC must not allow MEC Dhlomo to escape justice’, accessed from 
http://www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-analysis/sahrc-must-not-allow-mec-dhlomo-to-escape-justice- 
(accessed on 15 May 2018); ‘KZN health MEC appears before human rights commission’ Daily News, 14 May 
2018 available at https://www.iol.co.za/dailynews/news/kzn-health-mec-appears-before-human-rights 
commission-14968871 (accessed on 15 May 2018). 
145 Ibid. 
146 Ibid. 
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delays in treatment or a lack of access to proper oncology services in the province’s 
hospitals’.147 
Since the hearing at Braamfontein, some progress has been made by the KZN Health 
Department, in efforts to comply with the recommendations issued by the SAHRC.148 
Following the hearing, a site inspection conducted at Addington Hospital on 5 June 2018, by 
a delegation from the KZN Provincial Office of the SAHRC confirmed that one linear 
accelerator (VRALA) machine had been successfully repaired.149  
The VRALA machine treated the first patient on 5 June 2018, and staff previously placed at 
Inkosi Albert Luthuli had returned to Addington Hospital to resume their duties at the 
oncology unit.150 In addition, a newly qualified oncologist, Dr Nokwanda Zuma, had been 
recruited.151 Dr Zuma stated that treatment would now resume for patients currently awaiting 
treatment, including new patients, and that she would require at least 6 specialists to run the 
oncology unit.152 She further stated that more patients would be treated once Dr Shona 
Budree, the manager of oncology services in Durban, returned to Inkosi Albert Luthuli 
Central as head of their oncology unit in July 2018.153 
In the wake of these improvements, Keeka, said it was important to remember that there is 
still only one senior oncologist for a lengthy patient list.154Moreover, a report compiled by the 
National Health Council, revealed that KZN continues to have the biggest backlog of 
oncology patients who await treatment in South Africa.155 Approximately 8000 oncology 
patients await treatment at one of the three main state oncology hospitals ie. Inkosi Albert 
Luthuli Central Hospital, Addington Hospital and Greys Hospital.156 Keeka also added that 
justice needs to be attained for those whose lives were lost during the crisis, due to poor 
standards of health care created by the actions of the public health officials.157 
 
 
147 Imran Keeka ‘#KZNOncologyCrisis: SAHRC must not allow MEC Dhlomo to escape justice’, accessed from 
http://www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-analysis/sahrc-must-not-allow-mec-dhlomo-to-escape-justice- 
(accessed on 15 May 2018); ‘#KZNOncologyCrisis: MEC Dhlomo tries to worm his way out of accountability for 
hundreds of deaths’ accessed from http://www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-analysis/sahrc-must-not-allow-
mec-dhlomo-to-escape-justice- (accessed on 17 May 2018). 
148 ‘Media Statement: SAHRC Conducted a Site Inspection at Addington Hospital, Assessing KZN Health 
Department’s Compliance with Commission’s Recommendations’ 7 June 2018 accessed from 
https://www.sahrc.org.za/index.php/sahrc-media/news-2/item/1360-media-statement-sahrc-conducted-a-
site-inspection-at-addington-hospital-assessing-kzn-health-department-s-compliance-with-commission-s-
recommendations (accessed on 20 May 2018). 
149 Imran Keeka op cit (note 103). 
150 Ibid. 
151 ‘Oncology treatment to resume at Addington Hospital’ Daily News, 13 June 2018 accessed from 
https://www.iol.co.za/dailynews/oncology-treatment-to-resume-at-addington-hospital-15454710 (accessed 
on 13 August 2018). 
152 Ibid. 
153 Imran Keeka op cit (note 103).  
154 Ibid. 
155 ‘KZN has biggest cancer patient backlog’ Daily News, 26 August 2018 accessed from 
https://www.iol.co.za/dailynews/kzn-has-biggest-cancer-patient-backlog-17229453 (accessed on 27 August 
2018).  
156 Ibid. 
157 Imran Keeka op cit (note 103). 
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2.6    Conclusion 
The first part of this chapter considered the constitutional violations of oncology patients, 
during the oncology crisis. The violations have been established by the SAHRC, following 
various investigations and interviews into the crisis. Shortage of staff, non-functional 
equipment and delays in treatment are amongst their findings.  
In addition, the Commission evaluated the reasonableness of the actions of public health 
officials in the KZN Department of Health and, found evidence to satisfy the allegation that 
officials failed to act reasonably in realising the right of access to health care, for oncology 
patients. 
It is against this backdrop that this paper will explore the position of cervical cancer patients 
in KZN. Although treatment has gradually resumed, the question that begs a response is what 
remedies are available to cervical cancer patients who have suffered harm, during 2015-2017. 
Furthermore, the question remains as to which public health officials should be held 
responsible for cervical patients not being able to access health care services. The following 
chapters of this research will address these questions.  
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CHAPTER THREE: LEGAL AND ETHICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE RIGHT OF 
ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE 
 
As previously mentioned in chapter two, there is a strong legal framework in South Africa 
which has been established to realise the constitutional right of access to health care 
services.158 This chapter sets out the various forms of legal instruments relating to health care 
in South Africa which includes legislation, policy, regulations, ethical guidelines and refers to 
international law instruments which have been ratified by South Africa. The constitutional 
right of access to health care has been already been discussed in Chapter two.159 
3.1   Human right norms applicable to the context of the right of access to health care 
Section 39(1) of the constitution provides that a court, tribunal or forum must consider 
international law when interpreting the rights set out in the Bill of rights.160 Therefore, the 
constitution is instrumental in ensuring that international law instruments are considered 
when interpreting the right of access to health care.161 In accordance with section 39(1) 
several international and regional legal instruments, which have been ratified by South 
Africa, will be used in interpreting the right of access to health care. These include, The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, The International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, The African Charter, The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights and health standards provided by the World Health Organisation.  
 
3.1.1   Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 (UDHR). 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is a revolutionary human rights 
document that sets out, for the first time in history, a set of fundamental human rights that 
must be protected.162 Chapman takes the view that the UDHR is regarded as the ‘mainspring’ 
of all human rights that exists today.163 The document was drafted by various representatives 
from around the globe, with a range of different legal and cultural influences.164 The 
Declaration has been deemed a common standard for all member states to achieve the 
fundamental rights and freedoms contained in the declaration, for all individuals.165 
Article 25(1) of the declaration states: 
 ‘that everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of 
himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary 
 
158 SAHRC Public Hearings Report op cit (note 57). 
159 See Chapter two part 2.1 for discussion on constitutional right(s) violations as a result of the oncology crisis. 
160 The Constitution (note 32) Section 39(1).  
161A Singh, T Maseko ‘The protection of prisoners’ rights to health care services in South African law: Is it 
adequate?’ 31 Journal for Juridical Science (2006) 87. 
162 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 available at http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-
human-rights/ (accessed on 29 August 2018).  
163 AR Chapman ‘Exploring a human rights approach to health care reform’ United States of America: AAAS 
Publications (1993) 7. 
164 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights op cit (note 187). 
165 Ibid. 
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social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, 
widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.’166  
The standard of adequate living which the declaration prescribes, expressly includes medical 
care. 
 
3.1.2  International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966. 
(ICESCR) 
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural rights (ICESCR) forms part of 
the International Bill of Rights, together with the UDHR and the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political rights.167 The rights contained in the ICESCR enable individuals to live a 
life with dignity and covers economic, social and cultural rights.168 The Covenant commits its 
member parties to work toward achieving these rights, including the right to health. South 
Africa ratified the ICESCR on 12 January 2015.169 
Article 12(1) of the Covenant provides for the right to health to which every individual is 
entitled.170 Further, it states that every person should enjoy the highest standard of physical 
and mental health that is attainable by a member state of the Covenant.171 Article 12(1) goes 
on to set out some guidelines that parties to the covenant should follow, so that the right to 
heath is fully realised. These guidelines include the need to provide for: 
(a) ‘The reduction of the stillbirth-rate and infant mortality, and the healthy development 
of the child; 
 
(b)  The improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene; 
 
(c)  The prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and other 
diseases; 
 
(d)  The creation of conditions which would assure to all medical service and medical 
attention in the event of sickness.’172 
 
166 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 25(1) available at 
http://www.claiminghumanrights.org/udhr_article_25.html (accessed on 22 August 2018).  
167  International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1954 available at 
https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/our-human-rights-work/monitoring-and-promoting-un-
treaties/international-covenant-economic-social (accessed on 29 August 2018).  
168 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights op cit (note 192). 
169 ‘SAHRC welcomes Government’s decision to ratify the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR)’ available at https://www.sahrc.org.za/index.php/sahrc-media/news-2/item/305-
sahrc-welcomes-government-s-decision-to-ratify-the-international-covenant-on-economic-social-and-cultural-
rights-icescr (accessed on 29 August 2018).  
170 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Article 12(1).  
171 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights op cit (note 195). 
172 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Article 12(2) accessed from 
https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/cescr.aspx (accessed on 22 August 2018).  
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3.1.3  The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1986. (Banjul Charter) 
Similar to the UDHR and the ICESCR, the Banjul Charter is an international law instrument 
that aims to promote and protect the fundamental human rights of individuals and basic 
freedoms, in Africa.173 In addition, an African Court on Human and People’s Rights has been 
created to protect the rights contained in the Charter.174 The Banjul charter was ratified by 
South Africa on 9 July 1996.175  
Article 16(1) provides for the right of every individual to have the ‘best attainable state of 
physical and mental health’.176 It further notes, that there is a duty on member states to 
protect the health of all individuals and provide individuals with medical care when they are 
ill.177  
It is submitted, that the African Charter is the most useful instrument because it is drafted to 
take into account African culture and legal philosophy, that is particularly directed toward 
African needs and concerns.178 This can be observed from the Charter’s preamble.179 As a 
result, the Charter allows member states to evaluate their responsibility in protecting 
individual’s human rights, according to an instrument that recognises the challenges unique 
to Africa and its people. 
 
3.1.4  World Health Organisation (WHO) 
South Africa is a member of the World Health Organisation (WHO), which provides 
leadership to those members in the United Nations system on matters that are critical to 
health care.180 The WHO also establishes norms and standards in health care and monitors 
their implementation, while assessing health trends and the evolving health situations 
globally.181 In addition, cancer as a non-communicable disease (NCD), is an area in the 
health system within which WHO works.182 
According to the WHO, health should be understood as a human right which creates a legal 
obligation on states to ensure that there is access by individuals to this fundamental human 
 
173 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1981 available at http://www.achpr.org/instruments/achpr/ 
(accessed on 22 August 2018).  
174 The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 2004 accessed from http://en.african-
court.org/index.php/12-homepage1/1-welcome-to-the-african-court (accessed on 22 August 2018). 
175 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights ‘State Reporting’ available at  
http://www.achpr.org/states/ (accessed 22 August 2018).  
176 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Article 16(1). 
177 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Article 16(2).  
178 N Ewunetie, A Alemayehu ‘The Distinctive Feature of the African Charter’ (2012) accessed from 
https://www.abyssinialaw.com/about-us/item/361-the-distinctive-feature-of-the-african-charter (accessed on 
22 October 2018).  
179 Ibid. 
180 World Health Organisation ‘What we do’ accessed from http://www.who.int/about/what-we-do/en/ 
(accessed on 30 August 2018).  
181 World Health Organisation ‘What we do’ op cit (note 205). 
182 Ibid. 
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right.183 This obligation means ensuring access to health care that is timely, appropriate, 
acceptable, affordable and of appropriate quality.184  
The Constitution of WHO further reaffirms the standard of health care provided by the 
UDHR, ICESCR and the African Charter, by providing that ‘the enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental rights of every human being without 
distinction of race, religion, political beef, economic or social condition’185 
Further, WHO has released a draft global strategy on eliminating cervical cancer and has 
named this type of cancer a global health priority.186 The strategy covers the plan for the next 
century (2020 – 2030) and proposes key interventions that will lead to elimination of cervical 
cancer as a public health problem.187  
These approaches include HPV vaccinations, screening and treatment of pre-cancer, early 
detection and prompt treatment of invasive cervical cancers and palliative care.188 WHO is set 
to establish a further framework to monitor implementation and validate elimination of 
cervical cancer as a public health concern.189 
This draft policy is in addition to the existing ‘Comprehensive cervical cancer control: a 
guide to essential practice’190 published in 2014, which also deals with HPV vaccinations, use 
of HPV tests as a tool for early detection of cervical cancer and wider education of this 
disease, specifically in rural areas where there is clear inequity regarding health care 
services.191 
 
 
3.1.5  Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1985 (CESCR). 
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural rights (CESCR) was established to monitor 
the application of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights by its 
member states.192 The Committee consists of 18 independent experts with high moral 
 
183 World Health Organisation ‘Human Rights and Health’ accessed from 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs323/en/ (accessed on 30 August 2018). 
184 World Health Organisation ‘Human Rights and Health’ op cit (note 208). 
185 World Health Organisation - Statement by Dr T.A Ghebreyesus, WHO Director-General  ‘Health is a 
fundamental human right’ 2017 accessed from 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/fundamental-human-right/en/ (accessed on 22 August 
2018).  
186 World Health Organisation ‘Global Strategy towards the elimination of Cervical Cancer as a public health 
problem – Draft’ accessed from https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/documents/cervical-cancer-
elimination-draft-strategy.pdf (accessed on 26 February 2020).  
187 Ibid. 
188 Ibid. 
189 Ibid. 
190 World Health Organisation ‘Comprehensive cervical cancer control: a guide to essential practice’ accessed 
from https://www.who.int/reproductivehealth/publications/cancers/cervical-cancer-guide/en/ (accessed on 
26 February 2020).  
191 Ibid. 
192 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1985 accessed from 
https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/cescr/pages/cescrindex.aspx (accessed on 30 August 2018).  
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standing and renowned competence in the area of human rights.193 The Committee adopted 
General Comment 14 ‘The right to the highest attainable standard of health’ (Article 12), 
which confirms the common position on the right to health, by the above international 
instruments.194 General Comment 14 states that health care facilities must be physically and 
economically accessible to the population, culturally and ethically acceptable to the 
environment, and must provide an appropriate quality of medical care.195  
In addition, General Comment 14 provides that: 
➢ There is an obligation on a state party to respect an individual’s right to health and 
therefore, it should not deny or limit his/her access to health care services.196 These 
health services must also be available to all individuals and free from 
discrimination.197 
 
➢ It is the duty of a state party to protect the right to health and ensure equal access to 
health care services to all individuals.198 This duty entails, inter alia, adopting 
legislation and other measures to achieve equal access to health care services, 
particularly access for vulnerable groups like women.199 
 
➢ There is an obligation on a state party to promote and fulfil the right to health, by 
fostering research, distributing appropriate information and implementing measures 
including policy plans, that realise the right to health.200 
 
➢ Finally, it is a duty of a state party to provide for people in need of a health care 
service, in the absence of a group or individual who is able to provide the specific 
service that is required.201 In addition, state parties must recognise the needs of 
vulnerable groups and realise their right to health using within the means at their 
disposal.202 
Unlike the above international instruments, General Comment 14 specifically provides the 
duty of member states, to adopt measures that achieve equality in health care, particularly for 
women as a vulnerable group. 
 
193 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ‘Membership’ accessed from 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CESCR/Pages/Membership.aspx (accessed on 30 August 2018).  
194 CESCR General Comment No. 14: ‘The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health’, Article 12 
accessed from https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4538838d0.pdf (accessed on 24 August 2018). 
195 CESCR General Comment No. 14 General comment op cit (note 213) para 12.  
196 CESCR General Comment No. 14 General comment op cit (note 213) para 34. 
197 Ibid. 
198 CESCR General Comment No. 14 General comment op cit (note 213) para 35. 
199 Ibid. 
200 CESCR General Comment No. 14 General comment op cit (note 213) para 36-37. 
201 CESCR General Comment No. 14 General comment op cit (note 213) para 37. 
202 Ibid. 
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It is submitted, that the general position on the right to health in terms of the above 
international and regional human rights instruments, is that there is a duty on the state to 
ensure that individuals have access to health care. The provision of health care must be of the 
‘highest attainable standard of health’. This can be done by adopting appropriate measures to 
ensure that the right to health is realised. 
 
3.2    Legal Framework 
The relevant legislative framework regulating the right of access to health care as it pertains 
to the issues of the oncology crisis include the National Health Act, the Public Finance 
Management Act and the Hazardous Substances Act. 
 
3.2.1    The National Health Act 
The National Health Act203 was enacted to give effect to section 27(2) of the constitution 
which provides that the state must take legislative and other measures, to ensure that the right 
of access to health care is progressively realised within the available resources of the state.204   
The purpose of the National Health Act is set out in section 2 and provides that the objective 
of the act is to regulate heath care services in South Africa, in both the public and private 
sector.205 Further, the Act aims to establish a health system that provides equitable and 
progressive realisation of the right of access to health care.206 Section 2 also states that the 
National Health Act sets out the rights and duties of health personnel,207 including the 
specific duty to protect and promote the rights of ‘vulnerable groups such as women, 
children, older persons and persons with disabilities’.208 
The duties of the Minister of Health are dealt with in section 3 and places a duty on the 
Minister to fulfil these duties, within the resources available to the state.209 These ministerial 
obligations include: 
o Protecting and maintaining the health of the population.210 
o Determining the policies and measures required to ensure provision of essential health 
care services that must include primary health services, as determined after 
consultation with the National Health Council.211 
o Equitably arranging and prioritising health services which the state is able to provide, 
including advocating for the inclusion of health services in the socio-economic plan of 
the Republic.212 
 
203 The National Health Act 61 of 2003. 
204 The Constitution (note 32) Section 27(2). 
205 The National Health Act (note 116) Section 2(a)(i). 
206 The National Health Act (note 116) Section 2(a)(ii). 
207 The National Health Act (note 116) Section 2(b). 
208 The National Health Act (note 116) Section 2(c)(iv). 
209 The National Health Act (note 116) Section 3(1). 
210 The National Health Act (note 116) Section 3(1)(a). 
211 The National Health Act (note 116) Section 3(1)(c)-(d). 
212 The National Health Act (note 116) Section 3(1)(e)-(b). 
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In addition to the aforementioned duties of the Minister, section 3(2) sets out the duty of the 
National and Provincial Health Departments, together with every local municipality, to 
equitably provide health care services that are required in terms of the National Health Act, 
within the state’s available resources.213 
Further, the MEC for health in every province of the Republic must ensure that National 
Health policy, norms and standards are enforced in that province.214 It is also stated that the 
relevant head of a Provincial Health Department must provide health services that is in 
accordance with both National Health policy, and the health policy of that province.215 The 
health services relevant to the oncology crisis in KZN include, the provision of specialised 
hospital services, efficient management of finance and human resources and the control of the 
quality of health care services and facilities.216  
 
3.2.1.1   Duty of transfer 
Where a public health establishment is unable to provide the necessary treatment needed by a 
user217, such user must be transferred to another public health facility which can provide the 
required treatment.218 The relevant MEC for health in a province may determine the terms 
and manner in which the treatment or care is provided, and the MEC must make this decision 
in a procedurally fair, economic and prompt way.219 
 
213 The National Health Act (note 116) Section 3(2). 
214 The National Health Act (note 116) Section 25(1). 
215 The National Health Act (note 116) Section 25(2). 
216 The National Health Act (note 116) Section 25(2): 
 ‘The head of a provincial department must, in accordance with national health policy and the relevant 
provincial health policy in respect of or within the relevant province— 
(a) provide specialised hospital services; 
(b) plan and manage the provincial health information system; 
(f) plan, co-ordinate and monitor health services and must evaluate the rendering of health services; 
(i) plan, manage and develop human resources for the rendering of health services; 
(j) plan the development of public and private hospitals, other health establishments and health agencies; 
(k) control and manage the cost and financing of public health establishments and public health agencies; 
(l) facilitate and promote the provision of comprehensive primary health services and community hospital 
services; 
(n) control the quality of all health services and facilities; 
(o) provide health services contemplated by specific provincial health service programmes;  
(p) provide and maintain equipment, vehicles and health care facilities in the public sector; 
(w) provide services for the management, prevention and control of communicable and non-communicable 
diseases.’ 
217 The National Health Act (note 116) Section 1: 
‘‘user’ means the person receiving treatment in a health establishment, including receiving blood or blood 
products, or using a health service, and if the person receiving treatment or using a health service is (a) 
below the age contemplated in section 39 (4) of the Child Care Act, 1983 (Act No. 74 of 1983), 
‘user’ includes the person’s parent or guardian or another person authorised by law to act on the 
firstmentioned person’s behalf; or (b) 
incapable of taking decisions, ’user’ includes the person’s spouse or partner or, in the absence of 
such spouse or partner, the person’s parent, grandparent, adult child or brother or sister, or another 
person authorised by law to act on the firstmentioned person’s behalf.’ 
218 The National Health Act (note 116) Section 44(2).  
219 Ibid. 
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3.2.1.2   Provision of human resources  
Section 48 deals with development and provision of human resources in the National Health 
system. It provides that the National Health Council must establish policy and guidelines for 
human resources, and effectively monitor the utilisation, provision, distribution and 
management of the human resources in the National Health system.220  
The policy and guidelines established by the National Health Council must, inter alia, 
advance and enable: (a) the necessary distribution of human resources, (b) the provision of 
appropriately trained staff at every level of the health system, (c) making sure that the health 
needs of the population are met and (d) ‘the effective and efficient utilisation, functioning, 
management and support of system to meet the population’s health care needs; and human 
resources within the National Health system’.221 
It is submitted, that the National Health Act recognises the importance of protecting the rights 
of women since they are a vulnerable and marginalised group. Therefore, the rights of 
cervical cancer patients are recognised by the National Health Act as rights that need 
promotion and protection by health personnel.  
In addition, the National Health Act also prescribes, in detail, the duties of the MEC for 
health in a province and the Minister of Health in the Republic. This is useful in determining 
the accountability of these public health officials in the oncology crisis in KZN, particularly 
in the issues relevant to the oncology crisis, such as the need for effective management of 
human resources and the duty to transfer patients to a different health care facility when a 
certain facility is unable to provide the required treatment. 
 
3.2.2    The Hazardous Substances Act 
In South Africa oncology equipment like the VRALA machines, which are used to treat 
cervical cancer patients, are regulated by the Hazardous Substances Act 15 of 1973. These 
machines contain radio-active material and are categorised as Group IV substances, 
according to the Hazardous Substances Act.222 The Hazardous Substances Act and its 
regulations will be discussed further in Chapter five.223 
 
 
 
 
 
 
220 The National Health Act (note 116) Section 48(1). 
221 The National Health Act (note 116) Section 48(2)(a)-(c) 
222 The Hazardous Substances Act 15 of 1973 Section 2(1)(c).  
223 See Chapter 5 Part 5.1.2 for discussion on the Hazardous Substances Act, and the sections that have been 
breached during the oncology crisis between 2015 – 2017. 
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3.2.3   The Public Finance Management Act  
The Public Finance Management Act224 regulates the management of finances at both 
national and provincial government.225 It provides the procedures that should be used to 
ensure ‘efficient’ and ‘effective’ management of revenue, assets, liabilities and 
expenditure.226 Further, it establishes the responsibilities of public officials who hold 
positions of managing finance.227 
The Public Finance Management Act aims to secure accountability and transparency in 
managing public and government institutions.228 The relevance of this Act in relation to the 
oncology crisis will be discussed in Chapter five.229 
 
3.3   Regulations 
Regulations have equal legal force as legislation in South Africa.230 The relevant regulation 
concerning health care, within the context of the oncology crisis, is the Norms and Standards 
Regulations in terms of Section 90 (1) (b) and (c) of the NHA, applicable to certain 
categories of Health Establishments.  
 
3.3.1   Norms and Standards Regulations in terms of Section 90 (1) (b) and (c) of the 
NHA, applicable to certain categories of Health Establishments (Norms and Standards 
Regulations), 2003. 
The Norms and Standards Regulations intend to monitor, guide and implement control of 
risks to health care.231 To achieve risk control in various categories of health care facilities, 
necessary health systems and support structures are required so that the provision of safe, 
quality health care is achieved.232  
 
224 The Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999. 
225 ‘Summary of the Public Finance Management Act, no. 1 of 1999 (With Amendments)’ accessed from 
https://ossafrica.com/esst/index.php?title=Summary_of_the_Public_Finance_Management_Act%2C_no._1_of
_1999_%28With_Amendments%29  (accessed on 13 November 2018).  
226 The Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999 – Long title.  
227 Summary of the Public Finance Management Act op cit (note 138). 
228 Summary of the Public Finance Management Act op cit (note 138). 
229 See Chapter 5 Part 5.7.1 for discussion on the Public Finance Management Act and its relevance to the 
oncology crisis.  
230 ‘The Policy and law making process’ accessed from 
http://www.etu.org.za/toolbox/docs/govern/policy.html (accessed on 22 October 2018).  
231 Norms and Standards Regulations in terms of Section 90 (1) (b) and (c) of the National Health Act, 
applicable to certain categories of Health Establishments (Norms and Standards Regulations) 2003 Regulation 
4. 
232 Norms and Standards op cit (note 144) Regulation 4. 
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Regulation 5 of the Norms and Standards Regulations, refers to all rights contained in the 
Patients’ Rights Charter,233 and states that these rights must be respected and protected by a 
health establishment to ensure that patients are treated with dignity.234  
With respect to referral systems, a health establishment must also establish and maintain 
referral systems and discharge planning for further care, which guards health users from 
unnecessary costs whilst promoting continuity of care without disruption.235 In addition, a 
health establishment must reduce delays for a patient accessing health care by ensuring that a 
patient is taken care of in a manner that conforms with the nature and severity of a patient’s 
health condition and his/her specific needs.236  
In accordance with Regulation 11(1) of the Norms and Standards Regulations, a health 
establishment must make certain that users who are booked for a specific health service or 
treatment must receive these services within the agreed stipulated time frame.237 This will 
protect users from delays in treatment, which could result in morbidity and mortality.238 To 
protect against delays in treatment, regulation 11(2) states that a health establishment must: 
‘(a) Monitor and manage waiting lists for elective procedures; 
(b) Monitor and manage waiting lists for users who are accessing outpatient 
services at higher levels of care; 
(c) Implement measures to reduce waiting lists; and 
(d) Monitor and manage that in-patients referred for specialist care receive 
the needed service.’239 
Further, health establishments must also provide health services, essential equipment and 
orchestrate plans that are appropriate to the category of a health establishment and the 
relevant needs of the population, which the health establishment serves.240 Section 35 of the 
National Health Act lists features that may be used to categorise health establishments.241  
 
233 Patient Rights’ Charter accessed from http://www.kznhealth.gov.za/Patientcharter.htm (accessed on 3 May 
2019).  
234 Norms and Standards op cit (note 144) Regulation 5(1).  
235 Norms and Standards op cit (note 144) Regulation 9(1).  
236 Norms and Standards op cit (note 144) Regulation 10(1).  
237 Norms and Standards op cit (note 144) Regulation 11(1).  
238 Ibid.  
239 Norms and Standards op cit (note 144) Regulation 11(2).  
240 Norms and Standards op cit (note 144) Regulation 14(1) and (2) (b)-(f).  
241 The National Health Act (note 116) Section 35 - The Minister may by regulation 
(a) classify all health establishments into such categories as may be appropriate, based on  
(i) their role and function within the national health system;  
(ii) the size and location of the communities they serve;  
(iii) the nature and level of health services they are able to provide;  
(iv) their geographical location and demographic reach;  
(v)           the need to structure the delivery of health services in accordance with national norms and    
standards within an integrated and coordinated national framework; and 
       (vi)   in the case of private health establishments, whether or not the establishment is for profit or not; and 
       (b)    in the case of a central hospital, determine the establishment of the hospital board and the 
management system of such central hospital. 
 
29 
 
Lastly, regarding medical equipment, a health establishment must make certain that 
functional equipment is available to provide effectual care and treatment to the user.242 For 
this to be achieved the health establishment must:  
 ‘(a) Develop medical equipment management plans to meet the needs of the 
health establishment; 
(b) Demonstrate that medical equipment needs will be fulfilled within 
budget allocations; 
(c) Ensure that —    
(i)             licensed medical equipment is available and functional across all 
service areas; 
(ii) medical equipment has a planned maintenance schedule and it is 
followed; 
(iii) the medical equipment is documented as being functional compliant 
with manufacturer operational specifications; and 
(iv) medical equipment is disposed of in accordance with applicable 
legislation; and monitor the service level agreement for the maintenance of 
medical equipment and report any contractual breaches in the maintenance of 
medical equipment to the relevant authority.’243 
It is submitted that the Norms and Standards regulate the areas of health care which have 
been contributing factors to the oncology crisis, and that public officials have failed to 
manage these areas. These include, referral systems, delays in treatment and the availability 
of functional medical equipment. 
Further, the Norms and Standards regulate the importance of the functioning of these areas in 
health care. The effects of mismanagement in these areas, are evident in the oncology crisis. 
 
3.4   Policy 
Policy is enacted by ministerial authorities with the purpose of outlining methods and 
principles, so that laws are fully enforced.244 In essence, it sets out the goals of a ministry.245 
The policies that will be discussed include, the National Policy on Quality in Healthcare and 
the National Core Standards for Health Establishment in South Africa. 
 
3.4.1   National Policy on Quality in Healthcare (2007) (National Policy) 
The National Policy identifies and lists some of the issues that hinder quality in health care.246 
These issues include, inter alia, inadequate diagnosis and treatment, inefficient use of 
 
242 Norms and Standards op cit (note 144) Regulation 38(1). 
243 Norms and Standards op cit (note 144) Regulation 38(2)(a), (b) and (c) (i)-(iii). 
244 ‘The Policy and law making process’ op cit (note 143). 
245 Ibid.  
246 A National Policy on Quality in Health care for South Africa (2007) 3 accessed from 
http://www.cohsasa.co.za/sites/cohsasa.co.za/files/publication_pdfs/qhc.pdf (accessed 20 August 2018). 
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resources, an inadequate referral system and an overall disregard for human dignity.247 These 
challenges are stated as ‘shortcomings’ which reduce productivity, increase health care costs, 
and ultimately put a patient’s health and life at risk.248 
The National Policy also focuses on the need for equity in health care, particularly 
concerning the needs of disadvantaged groups like women.249 To ensure that these vulnerable 
groups have access to quality health care, there must be a redistribution of health expenditure, 
redistribution of human resources (doctors and nurses) and implementation of standards to 
make certain that the whole population receive an ‘acceptable quality of care’.250 Equity in 
health care also requires the monitoring of such progress in these vulnerable groups.251 
The National Policy then goes on to provide measures which may be used to overcome the 
above challenges that hinder quality health care.252 These measures aim to engage with the 
health care workforce, so that adequate training and professional development are 
established.253 Moreover, the National Policy provides for the creation of units at all 
provincial health departments that will manage and monitor quality health care in the public 
sector.254 
Similarly, to the National Health Act it is submitted, that the National Policy reaffirms the 
need for equity in providing health care services, particularly for vulnerable groups.  
The National Policy also establishes measures that can be adapted when challenges arise in 
health care. These measures may be used as a benchmark, against which the efforts of public 
officials may be measured. The challenges listed in the National Policy also cover those 
issues experienced in the oncology crisis in KZN. These challenges include, inter alia, 
inadequate referral systems, inefficient use of resources and disregard for human dignity. 
 
3.4.2   National Core Standards for Health Establishment in South Africa (2011) 
(National Core Standards) 
The National Core Standards ‘assist in setting a benchmark against which delivery of services 
can be monitored’.255 The aim of the National Core Standards is said to develop a common 
definition of quality of care that should exist in all health establishments, as a guide to health 
personnel when they provide health care services to users.256 In addition, the National Core 
Standards sets out to establish a standard against which health establishments may be 
accessed and as a result, identifies gaps and strengths of each health establishment.257 Lastly, 
 
247 A National Policy on Quality in Health care for South Africa (2007) op cit (note 159). 
248 Ibid. 
249 A National Policy on Quality in Health care for South Africa (2007) 10.  
250 A National Policy on Quality in Health care for South Africa (2007) op cit (note 162). 
251 Ibid. 
252 A National Policy on Quality in Health care for South Africa (2007) 12 and 17.  
253 A National Policy on Quality in Health care for South Africa (2007) 14. 
254 A National Policy on Quality in Health care for South Africa (2007) 17 – 22. 
255 National Core Standards for Health Establishment in South Africa (2011) 8 accessed from 
http://www.rhap.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/National-Core-Standards-2011-1.pdf  (accessed on 20 
August 2018).  
256 National Core Standards for Health Establishment in South Africa (2011) op cit (note 168). 
257 Ibid. 
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the standards makes it mandatory for health establishments, who meet mandatory standards, 
to receive national certification.258 
In addition to the above, the National Core Standards provide seven ‘domains’ which refer to 
areas in health care where quality or safety may be at risk, as defined by the World Health 
Organisation (WHO).259 The scope of each domain contains standards for the delivery of 
quality health care, and sets out the criteria that must be complied with to achieve the 
stipulated standard in each domain.260 
The following domains, including their corresponding standards and criteria, are relevant to 
the oncology crisis in KZN: 
(a) Domain 1 (Patient rights) sets out the steps and criteria a health establishment needs 
to follow, so that the rights of a patient are upheld and protected.261  
(b) The criteria are established in accordance with the Batho Pele Principles262 and the 
Patient Rights Charter.263 
 
(c) Domain 2 (Patient safety, clinical governance and clinical care) deals with ensuring 
quality nursing, quality clinical care and ethical practice, particularly in cases of 
health care that is associated with greater clinical risk.264 
 
 
258 Ibid. 
259 National Core Standards for Health Establishment in South Africa (2011) 10. 
260 National Core Standards for Health Establishment in South Africa (2011) 13.  
261 National Core Standards for Health Establishment in South Africa (2011) 18. 
262 ‘The Batho Pele (‘People First’) principles are aligned to the Constitution – know the service you’re entitled 
to. Government officials must follow the ‘Batho Pele’ principles which require public servants to be polite, 
open and transparent and to deliver good service to the public. 
1. Consultation 
Citizens should be consulted about the level and quality of the public services they receive and, wherever 
possible, should be given a choice about the services that are offered. 
2. Service standards 
Citizens should be told what level and quality of public service they will receive so that they are aware of what 
to expect.  
3. Access 
All citizens should have equal access to the services to which they are entitled.  
4. Courtesy 
Citizens should be treated with courtesy and consideration.  
5. Information 
Citizens should be given full accurate information about the public services they are entitled to receive. 
6. Openness and transparency 
Citizens should be told how national and provincial departments are run, how much they cost and who is in 
charge. 
7. Redress 
If the promised standard of service is not delivered, citizens should be offered an apology, a full explanation 
and a speedy and effective remedy; and when complaints are made, citizens should receive a sympathetic, 
positive response. 
8. Value for money 
Public services should be provided economically and efficiently in order to give citizens the best possible value 
for money.’ accessed from http://localgovernmentaction.org.dedi6.cpt3.host-h.net/content/batho-pele-
principles (accessed on 28 August 2018). 
263 National Core Standards for Health Establishment in South Africa (2011) 18. 
264 National Core Standards for Health Establishment in South Africa (2011) 22.  
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(d) Domain 3 (Clinical support services) covers services that are essential for the 
provision of clinical care, diagnostic and therapeutic clinical support services, and 
medical technology and systems which are required for monitoring efficiency of care 
to patients.265 Under the sub-domain ‘Pharmaceutical services’, the standard of readily 
available medical supplies at all times is emphasised in the National Core 
Standards.266 
 
(e) Domain 5 (Leadership and governance) may be the most relevant to the oncology 
crisis. It deals with ‘proactive’ leadership and planning, together with risk 
management and support of supervisory structures, to further quality improvement in 
health care services.267 In addition, the sub-domain ‘Strategic management’ sets a 
standard for budget allocation and staffing, which will make certain that health 
services are provided as they have been planned.268 To achieve this standard, the 
criteria required includes a human resources allocation plan so that there is sufficient 
staff to meet the relevant service level.269 
 
(f) Finally, under Domain 6 (Operational Management) the standards and criteria are set 
for the effective management of, inter alia, human resources and finances to achieve 
the intended result of safe and effective patient care.270 The criteria include: 
 
- ‘(i) An approved staffing plan is in place, in accordance with occupancy rates, 
utilising rates and patient profiles, 
-  (ii) A human resource retention strategy is in place in order to ensure adequate and 
motivated staff.’271 
It is submitted, that the National Core Standards deal with various sectors in health care and 
provides a definition for quality of health care within each. The standards go on to provide 
guidelines, that can be used to achieve the requisite quality of health care. This makes it 
possible to establish the liability of public officials and facilities, by determining if the 
prescribed quality of care concerning each standard has been achieved. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
265 National Core Standards for Health Establishment in South Africa (2011) 26. 
266 National Core Standards for Health Establishment in South Africa (2011) 27. 
267 National Core Standards for Health Establishment in South Africa (2011) 34.  
268 National Core Standards for Health Establishment in South Africa (2011) 34. 
269 National Core Standards for Health Establishment in South Africa (2011) 35. 
270 National Core Standards for Health Establishment in South Africa (2011) 37.  
271 National Core Standards for Health Establishment in South Africa (2011) 38.  
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3.5   Ethical Guidelines promulgated by the Health Professions Council of South Africa 
(HPCSA) 
 
The Health Professions Council of South Africa is a regulatory body that sets the standards 
for professional conduct and ethical behaviour of registered health professionals (eg. 
practitioners, dentists, psychologists etc).272  
Booklet 8 of the guidelines deals with reproductive health of women.273 The guidelines 
provide that health practitioners must deliver quality health care to all women with equal 
consideration, regardless of their socio-economic status.274  
In addition, the guidelines place an ethical duty on health practitioners to be advocates for 
women’s health.275 It also obliges practitioners to make the public aware of health issues that 
plague women, so that the public becomes sensitized to these challenges.276 Practitioners 
should also organise professional groups and their own practices to make certain that 
essential health services are made available and accessible to disadvantaged, impoverished 
and underprivileged women.277 
Lastly, there is an ethical duty on health professionals to deal responsibly with resources that 
are scarce and limited, and to refrain from participating in improper financial agreements 
which disadvantage users.278 
It is submitted, that the ethical guidelines assist all health practitioners in the Republic to act 
ethically, and to advocate for the rights of women and their socio-economic rights. 
 
3.6   Conclusion  
There are numerous duties and guidelines imposed by the legal framework in South Africa, 
on the right of access to health care. It is clear from the above discussion that there are 
various legislative, policy and regulatory measures in place, to realise the right of access to 
health care for all individuals in the Republic. 
This chapter explored the different legal instruments which cover the obligations of public 
health officials and public health personnel. Furthermore, the legal framework covers 
challenges in health care which are relevant to the oncology crisis in KZN, including poor 
referral systems, mismanagement of resources, and delays in provision of treatment. It was 
 
272 ‘Overview of Health Professions Council of South Africa’ accessed from http://www.hpcsa.co.za/About 
(accessed on 23 August 2018).  
273 Health Professions Council of South Africa. Guidelines for Good Practice in the Healthcare Professions. 
Booklet 8. General Ethical Guidelines for Reproductive Health (2016). 
274 Health Professions Council of South Africa. Guidelines for Good Practice in the Healthcare Professions. 
Booklet 8. General Ethical Guidelines for Reproductive Health (2016) 5 c.f.’Recommendations on Ethical Issues 
in Obstetrics and Gynaecology by the FIGO Committee on the Ethical Aspects on Human Reproduction and 
Women’s Health’ 2003 available at http://www.figo.org (accessed on 30 August 2018) - These guidelines have 
in the main been drawn from the FIGO recommendations.  
275 HPCSA Booklet 8 op cit (note 223) 6.  
276 Ibid. 
277 Ibid. 
278 Health Professions Council of South Africa. Guidelines for Good Practice in the Healthcare Professions. 
Booklet 1. General Ethical Guidelines for Health Professions (2016) 12.  
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also noted that the guidelines and criteria set out for managing these challenges in health care, 
may be used to determine the liability of public health officials. 
This chapter went on to consider international instruments on the human right to health. The 
chapter established that the accepted quality of health care in a state, is the ‘highest attainable 
standard of care’ that the state can provide. It was further established, that women are 
recognised as a vulnerable and marginalised group, and that their right to health requires 
protection. This position on women is also emphasised by the ethical guidelines of the Health 
Professions Council of South Africa, which states that health practitioners must advocate for 
women’s reproductive rights. 
The chapter evaluated the legal framework on the right of access to health care in South 
Africa, by outlining the various legal instruments realising this right. The following chapter 
will investigate the civil remedies available to cervical cancer patients and their dependants, 
who suffered harm due to the oncology crisis in KZN during 2015-2017. Further, it will 
discuss the appropriateness of each remedy in bringing relief to cervical cancer patients. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: APPROPRIATE AND EFFECTIVE RELIEF FOR CERVICAL 
CANCER PATIENTS 
 
4.1    Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed the legal framework in relation to the right of access to health 
care, as it pertains to cervical cancer patients. The chapter then set out to explain the various 
forms of legal instruments available to support the protection and enforcement of an 
individual’s right to health and other fundamental rights, that are contained in the Bill of 
Rights. Focus was given to women who are regarded as a vulnerable group in our society. 
This chapter will evaluate with the need for effective and appropriate relief in respect of 
socio-economic right violations. The first part of this chapter considers two constitutional 
remedies which are available to cervical cancer patients ie. Constitutional damages and the 
Structural Interdict. In this research paper, there is more focus given to constitutional 
remedies, since there have been constitutional right violations of cervical cancer patients. It 
will also illustrate the circumstances under which the courts have granted these constitutional 
remedies.  
The second part of this chapter will consider two common law remedies ie. the Mandamus 
and Common Law damages, that may be used by cervical cancer patients whose 
constitutional rights have been violated during 2015-2017, as a result of the oncology crisis in 
KZN. It will also illustrate how courts have granted these common law remedies. 
The third part of this chapter will discuss alternative dispute resolution, particularly the 
arbitration procedure used in the Life Esidimeni hearing.279  
The oncology crisis in KZN deals with a violation of a socio-economic right ie. the right of 
access to health care. This violation is part of a systemic violation of the health rights of poor 
and marginalised people who are dependent on the public health sector.280 Therefore, before 
these remedies are considered, a discussion on what will constitute appropriate and effective 
relief in socio-economic right cases, that are systemic in nature, is necessary.  
 
4.1.1     Appropriate and effective relief for socio-economic right violations  
Section 38 of the Constitution provides that the remedy for a violation of a right contained in 
the Bill of Rights must be appropriate.281 Aside from the guidelines provided in section 
 
279 ‘No funds, yet Life Esidimeni dispute resolution process to go ahead’ BusinessDay, 13 September 2017 
accessed from https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/health/2017-09-13-no-funds-yet-life-esidimeni-
dispute-resolution-process-to-go-ahead/ (accessed on 5 November 2018).  
280 ‘SAHRC releases report on trends in human rights violations in South Africa’ 9 January 2018 accessed from  
https://www.sahrc.org.za/index.php/sahrc-media/news-2/item/1088-media-statement-sahrc-releases-report-
on-trends-in-human-rights-violations-in-south-africa (accessed on 5 November 2018); ‘Free healthcare is a 
human right’ Mail & Guardian, 17 May 2013 accessed from https://bhekisisa.org/article/2013-05-17-00-
comment-free-healthcare-is-a-human-right (accessed on 5 November 2018).  
281 The Constitution (note 32) Section 38 c.f. I Currie & J De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook (2013) 180. 
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172282 and section 8(3)283 of the Constitution, there is no definite rule as to what will 
constitute appropriate and effective relief for a claimant.284 Therefore, Currie and De Waal 
argue that this could mean section 38 of the Constitution sanctions a flexible approach to 
remedies.285 
Swanepoel notes that human rights litigation by the courts helps in alleviating inequalities, 
and thus conforms to the spirit of the Constitution.286 The Constitution also grants the court 
discretion to make any order that is just and equitable.287  
The Constitutional court in Minister of Health v TAC case,288 explained ‘appropriate relief’ to 
be relief that is just and fair regarding the issue before the court.289 The court went on further 
to provide in Fose v Minister of Safety and Security290, that the relief granted must also strike 
effectively at the root cause of the right violation.291 Since the Treatment Action Campaign 
case,292 the courts have shown an increasing willingness to employ flexible remedies, like 
structural interdicts, to ensure enforcement of socio-economic rights.293 
 
 
282 The Constitution (note 32) Section 172 - ‘(1) When deciding a constitutional matter within its power, a 
court— (a) must declare that any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid to the 
extent of its inconsistency; and  
(b)  may make any order that is just and equitable, including— (i) an order limiting the retrospective effect of 
the declaration of invalidity; and (ii) an order suspending the declaration of invalidity for any period and on any 
conditions, to allow the competent authority to correct the defect.  
(2) (a) The Supreme Court of Appeal, the High Court of South Africa or a court of similar status may make an 
order concerning the constitutional validity of an Act of Parliament, a provincial Act or any conduct of the 
President, but an order of constitutional invalidity has no force unless it is confirmed by the Constitutional 
Court.  
(b)  A court which makes an order of constitutional invalidity may grant a temporary interdict or other 
temporary relief to a party, or may adjourn the proceedings, pending a decision of the Constitutional Court on 
the validity of that Act or conduct.  
(c)  National legislation must provide for the referral of an order of constitutional invalidity to the 
Constitutional Court.  
(d)  Any person or organ of state with a sufficient interest may appeal, or apply, directly to the Constitutional 
Court to confirm or vary an order of constitutional invalidity by a court in terms of this subsection.’ 
283 The Constitution (note 32) Section 8(3) - ‘When applying a provision of the Bill of Rights to a natural or 
juristic person in terms of subsection (2), a court— (a) in order to give effect to a right in the Bill, must apply, 
or if necessary develop, the common law to the extent that legislation does not give effect to that right; and 
(b) may develop rules of the common law to limit the right, provided that the limitation is in accordance with 
section 36(1)’. 
284 I Currie & J De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook (2013) 180.  
285 Ibid. 
286 Swanepoel P ‘The potential of structural interdicts to constitute effective relief in socio-economic rights 
cases’ LLM Dissertation, Stellenbosch University (2017) 7.  
287 The Constitution (note 32) Section 172(1)(b).  
288 Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC). 
289 Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign supra (note 238) para 48 c.f. Swanepoel P op cit (note 236) 
17. 
290 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC).  
291 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security supra (note 240) para 96 c.f. Swanepoel P op cit (note 236) 17. 
292 Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign supra (note 238). 
293 Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes (2010) (3) SA 454 (CC); Centre for 
Child Law v Minister of Basic Education (2012) 4 All SA 35 (ECG) c.f. I Currie & J De Waal op cit (note 234) 597. 
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4.1.2   Systemic violations of socio-economic rights  
Mbazira294 and Sturm’s295 description of systemic right violations mirror the view taken by 
Rodriguez-Garavito296, who states that systemic violations of socio-economic rights are 
instances when government agencies fail to comply with public policy.297 This failure by the 
state contributes to socio-economic right violations.298 Rodriguez-Garavito further argues that 
socio-economic right violations adversely affect large groups of individuals in society.299 An 
example of this type of right violation is a failing public health system due to non-compliance 
by the state, and which is relied on by majority of a state’s population.300 
How courts have identified and dealt with systemic violations of socio-economic rights can 
be seen in the recent judgment of Sonke Gender Justice v Government of the Republic of 
South Africa.301 This case concerned the appalling conditions of the Pollsmoor Remand 
Detention Facility (Pollsmoor), in which detainees were living in.302 The Public Service 
Commission similarly described the conditions of the facility in 2016, as alarming and not fit 
for human habitation.303 
The High Court alluded to the systemic nature of the rights violations when it stated that 
over-crowding was one of the key problems that had persisted and even worsened, over a 
period of time.304 The court also noted that Pollsmoor was notorious for these inhumane and 
untenable living conditions, even before 1994.305 The court concluded that these living 
conditions were a manifestation of an ineffective justice system.306 This means that the 
current state of Pollsmoor did not result from actions by a particular group, but rather the acts 
of various people and many departments, over an extended period of time.307 It is submitted 
that this ongoing failure of public officials in carrying out their duties, makes the violation 
systemic in nature. 
 
294 C Mbazira Litigating Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: A Choice between Corrective and Distributive 
Justice (2009) 110.  
295 S P Sturm ‘A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies’ (1990) 79 Georgetown Law Journal 1377. 
296 C Rodríguez-Garavito ‘Beyond the Courtroom: The Impact of Judicial Activism on Socioeconomic Rights in 
Latin America’ (2010) 89 Texas Law Review.  
297 Rodríguez-Garavito op cit (note 246) 1671 c.f. Swanepoel P op cit (note 236) 57. 
298 Ibid. 
299 Rodríguez-Garavito op cit (note 246) 1671 c.f. Swanepoel P op cit (note 236) 59. 
300 Ibid. 
301 Sonke Gender Justice v Government of South Africa (2017) 24087/15.  
302 Sonke Gender Justice v Government of South Africa supra at note 251 para 2 c.f. Swanepoel P op cit (note 
236) 34. 
303 Ibid. 
304 Sonke Gender Justice v Government of South Africa supra at note 251 para 27 - 33 c.f. Swanepoel P op cit 
(note 236) 35. 
305 Sonke Gender Justice v Government of South Africa supra at note 251 para 1 c.f. Swanepoel P op cit (note 
236) 35. 
306 Sonke Gender Justice v Government of South Africa supra at note 251 para 119 - 128 c.f. Swanepoel P op cit 
(note 236) 35. 
307 Swanepoel P op cit (note 236) 35. 
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In this case, the Constitutional Court granted a strong structural interdict requiring immediate 
action, together with a stringent reporting-back condition, so that the infringed rights of 
detainees would be rectified.308 
Due to continuous non-compliance from the state, as illustrated in Sonke309, the remedy that 
is required must enable structural changes, where there have been a systemic violation of 
rights.310 Swanepoel notes that these changes need to aim at improving the interests of the 
affected individual or group.311 Furthermore, the remedy must have a deterrent effect that 
would lead to an end of the systemic violation.312 
 
4.1.3   Overarching norms for the remedial process  
Sturm argues that due to the ongoing nature of several public law violations, traditional 
remedies are usually ineffective.313 Sturm suggests applying the normative theory for public 
law remedies.314 This theory states that certain norms need to be present during the remedial 
process, so that the resultant remedy constitutes appropriate and effective relief.315 ‘These 
norms are participation, impartiality, respect for the separation of powers doctrine, reasoned 
decision-making and remediation’.316 
(a) Participation  
This norm states that parties who will be affected by the remedy, should be given a 
meaningful opportunity to contribute to the design of the remedy.317 Sturm suggests that 
participation serves two purposes: 
1. Allowing affected parties to participate in the remedial process will enhance their 
dignity, which may have been infringed as a result of the socio-economic right(s) 
violation.318 It may also contribute to the perceived fairness of the remedy adopted.319 
 
2. Participation is also likely to contribute to the effective compliance by the parties 
involved, since they were a part of the process.320 In addition, it helps the decision-
maker understand and define the group of people which the remedy will affect.321 
 
 
308 Sonke Gender Justice v Government of South Africa supra at 251 para 160 c.f. Swanepoel P op cit (note 236) 
34. 
309 Sonke Gender Justice v Government of South Africa supra at 251.  
310 Swanepoel P op cit (note 236) 59. 
311 Ibid. 
312 Swanepoel P op cit (note 236) 63.  
313 Sturm op cit (note 245) c.f. Swanepoel P op cit (note 236) 21-22. 
314 Ibid. 
315 Sturm op cit (note 245) 1410 c.f. Swanepoel P op cit (note 236) 21-22. 
316 Sturm op cit (note 245) 1390 c.f. Swanepoel P op cit (note 236) 21-22. 
317 Sturm op cit (note 245) 1410 c.f. Swanepoel P op cit (note 236) 21-22. 
318 Sturm op cit (note 245) 1392 c.f. Swanepoel P op cit (note 236) 23. 
319 Ibid. 
320 Sturm op cit (note 245) 1393 c.f. Swanepoel P op cit (note 236) 23. 
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The need for participation in the decision-making process was emphasised in Doctors for Life 
v Speaker of the National Assembly,322 where the Constitutional court stated that our 
constitutional order ‘envisages an active, participatory democracy’.323 The court also noted 
that participatory democracy is significant for individuals who are poor and marginalised.324 
Therefore, allowing participation of affected parties also conforms to the transformative 
nature of the Constitution.325 
(b) Respect for the separation of powers doctrine 
The remedial process must respect state institutions and their authority, so that the judiciary 
does not exceed their boundaries.326 In this regard, participation by the individuals involved 
could also be effective in democratising the remedial process, so that separation of power 
concerns is mitigated.327 
(c) Impartiality  
Sturm states that impartiality and objectivity must be used in the decision-making process, so 
that an effective remedy is established.328 This also means that the remedy chosen should not 
unfairly favour one party over the other(s).329 
(d) Reasoned decision-making  
Appropriate and effective relief can only be a result of reasoned decision-making.330 
Swanepoel argues that this will require reasons to be provided as to why a certain remedy 
was chosen as the most effective and appropriate, in the circumstances.331 This principle will 
also ensure impartiality from the decision-maker, since he/she would have to provide reasons 
for their decision.332 
(e) Remediation  
Sturm notes that for the remedial process to be legitimate and effective, it must be aimed at 
ensuring compliance with the violated constitutional principles.333 She does however, 
acknowledge that not all these norms can be completely satisfied since each issue has its own 
unique demands and constraints.334 As a result, certain circumstances may require these 
norms to be balanced against each other.335 
 
 
322 Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly 2006 (12) BCLR 1399 (CC).  
323 Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly supra at 272 para 235 c.f. Swanepoel P op 
cit (note 236) 24. 
324 Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly supra at 272 para 15 c.f. Swanepoel P op 
cit (note 236) 23. 
325 Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly supra at 272 para 235 c.f. Swanepoel P op 
cit (note 236) 24. 
326 Sturm op cit (note 245) 1410 c.f. Swanepoel P op cit (note 236) 24. 
327 Swanepoel P op cit (note 236) 24. 
328 Sturm op cit (note 245) 1410 c.f. Swanepoel P op cit (note 236) 25. 
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331 Swanepoel P op cit (note 236) 25. 
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4.2 Remedies available to cervical cancer patients  
 
4.2.1   Constitutional remedies   
Currie and De Waal state that the purpose of constitutional remedies is to (a) grant relief, (b) 
vindicate infringed constitutional right(s) and (c) deter future infringements.336 They also note 
that harm caused due to a constitutional right violation, is harm caused to the entire society, 
and not just to the individual applicant.337 
The authors argue that vindication of a constitutional right is vital, because such an act will 
diminish society’s trust and reliance on the Constitution, if not dealt with appropriately.338 
Furthermore, a constitutional right violation negatively impacts on realising a just and 
democratic society, as envisaged by the Constitution.339 
Currie and De Waal emphasise that it is the duty of the court to strike ‘effectively at the 
source of the infringement’.340 
 
4.2.2   Constitutional damages  
Despite, that in several instances, common law damages may be sufficient to bring effective 
relief when a person suffers harm, another type of damages may be claimed when an 
individual’s fundamental human rights listed in the Bill of Rights341, are violated. This type 
of damages is categorised as ‘constitutional damages’ and are relevant to cervical cancer 
patients, because their right of access to health (ie. a fundamental right) has been violated. 
The Supreme Court of Appeal in MEC for Department of Welfare v Kate,342 held that 
constitutional damages may be raised as a remedy, not only as a last resort to vindicate 
constitutional rights, but whenever it is just and equitable to do so, depending on the 
circumstances of the case.343  
De Vos and Freedman define constitutional damages as a sum of money which can be paid to 
an individual as compensation for harm caused, due to a violation of the individual’s 
constitutionally protected right(s).344 Due to shocking and frequent failure of the state to 
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meet its constitutional obligations, the concept of constitutional damages is more relevant 
now, than ever before.345 
The Constitution provides no exception to constitutional damages being awarded as relief 
when fundamental rights are violated.346 This position has been confirmed by the 
Constitutional Court in Fose v Minister of Safety and Security.347 In this case the court stated 
obiter that in principle, there is no reason why appropriate relief should not include an award 
for constitutional damages, where such an award would protect and enforce rights contained 
in the Bill of Rights.348 
Fose349 was the initial case since the inception of the Constitution, to consider constitutional 
damages as a means to bring appropriate relief.350 With regard to ‘appropriate relief’, the 
Constitutional court in Fose highlighted the following: 
 
➢ The facts and circumstances of each case must be assessed, to establish what relief 
would ensure protection and enforcement of rights enshrined in the Constitution.351 
The courts may also formulate any new remedy that would be needed to achieve 
protection of these rights.352 
 
➢ Where it is necessary to protect and enforce rights contained in the Bill of Rights, 
appropriate relief may include an award of constitutional damages.353 
 
➢ When a claimant has already been compensated by common law damages for any 
loss, a court must not award an additional punitive award using constitutional 
damages.354 This guideline is particularly relevant in a state like South Africa, where 
there are several constitutional obligations to fulfil with limited resources.355 
 
Further guidelines were set out by the Supreme Court of Appeal in MEC for the Department 
of Welfare v Kate356 to help determine when an award of constitutional damages would 
constitute appropriate relief.357 A court must consider, inter alia: 
(i) The nature and relative importance of the right(s) in dispute before the court.358 
 
345 M Toxopeüs ‘Constitutional damages: Recent decisions in focus’ 14 June 2018, Helen Suzman Foundation 
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(ii) The existence of any alternative remedies that could be used to assert and 
vindicate the infringed constitutional right(s).359 
 
(iii) The consequences of the breached rights for the claimants before the court.360 
 
4.2.2.1   Appropriateness of constitutional damages for socio-economic rights violations  
Mbazira argues that awarding constitutional damages for loss to non-patrimonial interests, is 
the most likely remedy to constitute appropriate and effective relief.361 In addition, Mbazira 
states that damages could serve as a deterrent that may lead to ending the systemic violation 
of constitutional rights, while simultaneously vindicating these rights.362 It could serve as a 
deterrent for public officials who contribute to systemic violations of constitutional rights, 
because their actions may result in payable damages being sought if they are held personally 
liable.363 
Mbazira’s view is dismissed by Sturm, who argues that constitutional damages will not 
constitute appropriate relief in cases of systemic violation of rights.364 Sturm bases her 
argument on two grounds: 
1. It is difficult to accurately quantify constitutional damages and there is a risk of 
undervaluing the harm caused by the violation of rights.365 The remedy of damages 
could also be viewed as the easier route to take, since it would be more onerous for 
the state to comply with their legal obligations, than to simply pay damages.366 
 
2. The second reason provided by Sturm is that, usually the parties responsible for 
constitutional violations are public officials, however, they are not held personally 
liable for payment of damages to aggrieved individuals.367 Therefore, since public 
officials are not paying from their own pockets, the deterrent effect of this remedy is 
not achieved.368  Furthermore, the payment of damages to affected individuals in 
socio-economic could have detrimental implications for the ‘public purse’.369 This 
financial disadvantage could have an adverse impact on the state’s ability to properly 
realise their constitutional obligations.370 
 
However, there has been a recent judgment by the High Court, where the MEC for 
Health in Gauteng was ordered to pay damages and costs to the plaintiff, in both his 
personal capacity and his representative capacity.371 The court held that the MEC 
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should be personally liable for the negligence of a gynaecologist, employed by the 
Gauteng Department of Health.372 The rationale given by the High Court was that the 
MEC played an essentially obstructive role in this case, continuously disputed facts 
that were not in dispute, and persisted in his approach of bare denial.373 
 
Despite the apprehensions raised by Sturm, the courts have recognised certain socio-
economic right violations that have constituted constitutional damages, as appropriate relief. 
The first case related to the right of access to adequate housing.374 The Supreme Court of 
Appeal in President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd,375 
awarded direct constitutional damages following failure by the state to comply with two bona 
fide court orders.  
The facts of this case involved an eviction from private property and the state’s failure to 
comply with section 26376 of the Constitution, by not providing alternative land for the 
unlawful occupiers.377 As a result, the Constitutional court concurred with the Supreme Court 
of Appeal’s decision to award constitutional damages.378 
The Supreme Court of Appeal again awarded constitutional damages in MEC for the 
Department of Welfare v Kate,379 which involved the delay in payment of social grants. The 
court dealt with an infringement of section 27(1)(c) of the Constitution, which provides for 
the right of access to social assistance.380 The infringement was regarded as systemic in 
nature by the court, and one that required constitutional damages as the appropriate and 
effective remedy.381 In this case constitutional damages were the only appropriate and 
effective relief, since a mandamus or declaratory order would not suffice due to non-
compliant behaviour from the government.382 Moreover, the grant beneficiaries would not 
have the resources or the education to enforce a mandamus.383 
Usually, it is the poor and most vulnerable members of society who require protection and 
enforcement of their socio-economic rights, by the courts. As previously mentioned, the 
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Constitution gives discretion to the courts to make any order that would give appropriate and 
effective relief to a claimant.384 
Hence, in Kate385 an award of constitutional damages was granted by the Supreme Court of 
Appeal based particularly on two grounds. Firstly, there had been unreasonable delay in the 
provision of social grants, and this delay amounted to a direct violation of the constitutional 
right to social assistance.386 Secondly, the breach of the right to social assistance extended 
beyond the circumstance of the individual before the court ie. Kate.387 Kate was an example 
of the state’s continuous failure to meet their constitutional obligations.388 
It is submitted that there has also been a continuous failure by the state to fulfil their 
constitutional obligations during the oncology crisis in KZN.  
 
4.2.2.2.  Recent awards of constitutional damages 
There have been two recent judgments which have considered if an award of constitutional 
damages would bring appropriate and effective relief. Despite both judgments involving 
tragic circumstances due to failure by the state to fulfil their constitutional obligations, the 
courts have granted different relief in each case. 
4.2.2.2.1    The Life Esidimeni tragedy 
The Life Esidimeni arbitration hearing illustrated the tragic outcome that followed the 
decision by the Gauteng Health Department to terminate a long-standing contract with the 
Life Esidimeni Care Centre, that provided care and treatment to mental health patients.389 
The decision to terminate the contract resulted in a transfer of 1 400 mental health patients to 
several non-governmental organisations, who were unqualified and unlicensed to provide 
care to these patients.390 The transfer resulted in 144 deaths, causing immense trauma to the 
survivors of this tragedy and families of the deceased.391 
Due to the magnitude of suffering and trauma caused by the state’s disregard for its 
constitutional duty to provide access to health care of an appropriate standard, the arbitrator 
held that an award for constitutional damages was the only means to fully vindicate the 
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infringed rights.392 The order for relief in the form of constitutional damages was granted 
over and above the common law damages for shock and trauma.393 
4.2.2.2.2    Komape v Minister of Basic Education 
In Komape v Minister of Basic Education394 a 5-year-old boy drowned in a faeces-infested pit 
toilet at his rural school in the Limpopo province. The family of the deceased sought relief, 
inter alia, in the form of constitutional damages owing to the failure of the Department of 
Education, to provide proper sanitation at rural schools.395 The failure of the state department 
violated several rights enshrined in the Constitution, including the right to life,396 rights of the 
child,397 the right to human dignity,398 the right to equality399 and the right to education400.401 
The High Court of Polokwane held that an award of constitutional damages in this case, 
would amount to an award of punitive damages.402 The court went on further to state that this 
would result in the Komape family being over-compensated, while not serving the needs of 
the society.403 Instead, the High Court awarded a structural interdict that obliged the 
Department of Education to install proper sanitation facilities in rural schools of Limpopo.404 
In the courts view, this remedy would better serve the interests of the public, and was the 
effective and appropriate remedy to vindicate the rights that had been infringed.405 
Toxopeüs argues that while the structural interdict may be effective in enforcing and 
protecting the rights of children in Limpopo, this remedy does very little to directly address 
and vindicate the rights of the Komape family.406 In addition, the ongoing and systemic 
failure of the state to fulfil their constitutional obligations in this case extends beyond the 
circumstances of just one child.407 Therefore, an award for constitutional damages would not 
have been an over-compensation to the family.408  
It is submitted that the view taken by Toxopeüs is agreed with because constitutional 
damages was necessary to vindicate the constitutionally protected rights of the Komape 
family, as well as to hold the state accountable for failure to meet their constitutional duties.  
Although there will always be alternative remedies well suited to fulfil constitutional 
obligations, the courts should not shy away from directly awarding constitutional damages.409 
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This remedy should be awarded particularly in cases where there have been ‘glaring and 
continuous state failure to adhere to its constitutional obligations’, as seen in the Komape 
case.410 In Komape411, the structural interdict only vindicated the infringed constitutional 
rights, but failed to provide compensation for the gross negligence and inaction experienced 
by the family.412 
Lastly, it is submitted that in some instances where constitutional rights have been severely 
violated, as in the Komape case and the oncology crisis in KZN, constitutional damages 
might be required to constitute appropriate and effective relief to those that have suffered 
harm. Swanepoel also importantly notes that since granting an award of constitutional 
damages will almost always have a negative impact on the public purse, such an award will 
depend on the facts and circumstances of a case.413 It is submitted that where public officials 
are held personally liable, the public purse will not be adversely affected.  
 
4.2.3   Structural interdict 
A structural interdict is an order of a court that instructs a violator to rectify an infringement 
of a fundamental right contained in the Constitution, under court supervision.414 It usually 
consists of in part, interdictory relief and implements time frames within which certain 
stipulated steps must be taken.415 Failure to comply essentially amounts to a contempt of 
court order.416 The structural interdict differs from other type of interdicts in that recipients 
are subjected to judicial review, for the purpose of ensuring compliance.417 
To effect judicial review, courts may issue periodic directives and continuously approve 
steps, to achieve complete remediation of the infringed right(s).418 The nature of a structural 
interdict is an ‘ongoing regime of performance’, which means that the court stays involved 
until the constitutional right(s) have been rectified.419 Mbazira states that the purpose of this 
remedy, according to the view taken by Currie and De Waal420, is that a structural interdict 
aims to deter future violations and facilitate structural change in institutional design, so as to 
end systemic violations.421 
In addition, Mbazira comments on the flexibility of the structural interdict design. He states 
that the structural interdict design is intended to adjust to the legal harm suffered at the time 
of litigation, and also designed to adjust future behaviour of the parties involved.422 Similar to 
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a structural interdict, a ‘reporting order’ issued by a court, requires parties to report-back to 
the court on the progress achieved concerning the infringements.423 However, these two 
orders differ in that a structural interdict contains a supervisory element, whereby, the court 
monitors the violator’s progress until the constitutional right is vindicated.424 In other words, 
the key difference between these orders, is the role of the court. For a structural interdict the 
court is a participant in the remedial process, whereas for a report order, the court is merely 
an observer of the progress made.425 
 
4.2.3.1     Important features of the structural interdict  
Mbazira places emphasis on two unique features of a structural interdict, which sets it apart 
from other constitutional remedies: 
1. Flexibility – Owing to the complexity and polycentric nature of socio-economic rights 
cases, it is common for further consequences and factors to develop after the initial 
remedy has been designed and ordered by a court.426 Therefore, the structural interdict 
remedy allows for adaptation during the remedial process, so that new challenges and 
new changes can be accommodated.427 
 
2. Supervisory role of the court – supervision by a court enables accountability of 
respondents and gives the court the capacity to deal with unforeseen issues.428 
Moreover, supervisory jurisdiction is beneficial to both the applicant and 
respondent.429 This is because applicants can approach the court without having to 
issue new proceedings, if there is non-compliance with the initial order granted by the 
court.430 In the same way, respondents may also approach the court on the same 
papers, to clarify any challenges with the order containing the initial directives issued 
by the court.431 
 
The unique features of the structural interdict remedy work collaboratively to contribute in 
the efficacy of this remedy, so that systemic violations of socio-economic rights are 
corrected.432 In addition, the effective remediation of socio-economic right violations requires 
proper interaction and co-operation between the government, civil society and the courts.433 
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Therefore, the unique features of this remedy as discussed above, have the potential to meet 
this criterion.434 
Currie and De Waal note that this remedy must be designed in a flexible manner, to guard 
against supervision by the court becoming too intrusive and blurring the lines between the 
executive and judicial powers.435 
4.2.3.2    Appropriateness of the structural interdict remedy for the oncology crisis in 
KZN 
Roach and Budlender argue that the structural interdict constitutes appropriate and effective 
relief for violations caused specifically where there is (a) government intransigence, (b) 
incompetence of the government and (c) a risk of irreparable harm.436 This view is also 
supported by De Vos et al.437 The authors state that the greatest hurdle in rectifying systemic 
violations, is that public officials intentionally fail to meet their positive obligations imposed 
by the Bill of Rights.438 Therefore, they submit that it is also likely that public officials are 
unlikely to comply with a mere court order.439 Following the findings of the SAHRC 
investigation, the following issues are also relevant in the oncology crisis of KZN: 
(a) Government intransigence – City of Cape Town v Neville Rudolph 
 
In City of Cape Town v Neville Rudolph,440 there had been a violation of the right of access to 
adequate housing as set out in section 26 of the Constitution, due to government 
intransigence. The factual context of Rudolph indicated that the state failed to provide proper 
housing for unlawful occupiers, who had been living in unbearable conditions with no 
alternative.441 
The court in this case considered the nature of the right violated, a balance of the parties’ 
interests, the reason given by the state for the violation, and the practicability of the structural 
interdict remedy.442 These factors were considered in light of the government’s unwillingness 
to accept responsibility for the infringement of rights in this case. Ultimately, the court in 
Rudolph granted a structural interdict, which included a report-back-order requirement, so 
that progress in the provision of housing could be monitored.443 
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(b) Government incompetence - Section 27 v Minister of Education 
 
Roach and Budlender state that in cases of government incompetence, the structural interdict 
remedy should not be viewed as a punishment by the court.444 Rather, it should be seen as an 
invitation for state departments to comply with their constitutional obligations with the 
support, guidance and supervision of the court.445 
This is illustrated in Section 27 v Minister of Education446 where failure by the Department of 
Education to provide textbooks to students in Limpopo, within a reasonable time, constituted 
a violation of a child’s right to basic education. Kollapen J stated that merely ordering 
delivery of textbooks would not suffice to vindicate the right to education.447 Consequently, 
the relief needed to go beyond the delivery of textbooks and was also required to address the 
negative impact that the lack of textbooks had created.448 In this regard, the court granted a 
structural interdict that directed the Department of Education to develop a ‘catch-up’ plan for 
all students affected by the non-delivery of textbooks.449 In this way, full and effective 
remediation of the right to basic education was ensured. 
(c) Risk of irreparable harm – EN v Government of the Republic of South Africa & Allpay 
Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive Officer of the South 
African Social Security Agency 
 
Lastly, Roach and Budlender consider that a structural interdict would also be appropriate 
and effective in circumstances of violations, that could result in irremediable harm.450 In 
some circumstances, it would not be adequate to solely vindicate the right because of the 
grave consequences that may be imminent and thus require urgent relief.451  
Considering that remedial action is sometimes achieved during a lengthy process through a 
structural interdict, it may not be ideal in circumstances where there are severe consequences 
imminent.452 For this reason, Roach and Budlender suggest that when granting a structural 
interdict in cases that have urgent interests, a detailed and immediate relief order should form 
part of the structural interdict.453 This immediate directive could prevent any further 
irremediable harm from occurring.454  
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Roach and Budlender state that this immediate relief can take the form of an interim relief 
order.455 The court stated in President of the Republic of South Africa v United Democratic 
Movement,456 that when an action is likely to cause irreparable prejudice or serious harm, 
interim relief could be designed to prevent this prejudice. The purpose of this relief is to 
provide immediate aid to those already affected, and to ensure further harm does not ensue.457 
This safeguard will allow the court the necessary time to create a remedy that will eventually 
effect gradual structural changes, that will meet the obligations imposed by the 
Constitution.458 
EN v Government of the Republic of South Africa,459 dealt with conditions that had 
underlying urgent interests. This case concerned the right of access to health care, involving 
prisoners who required ARV treatment.460 The court took note that this matter hinged on life 
or death of the prisoners who were severely ill at the time of the judgment.461 As a result, 
urgent rectification was needed.462 
The court in the EN case stated that there was an apparent degree of recalcitrance coupled 
with lack of commitment and inattentiveness by the state. 463 The state had no workable plan 
in place to assist in meeting their duty to provide health care to prisoners.464 In addition, the 
state’s attempt to fulfil their obligations in this case had been ‘characterised by delays, 
obstacles and restrictions’.465 
The court also commented on the nature of the infringement, which alluded to evidence of a 
continuous violation of prisoners’ rights.466 It was concluded that this ongoing systemic 
violation of the health rights of prisoners, who are a vulnerable group in society, require 
 
455 Ibid. 
456 President of the Republic of South Africa v United Democratic Movement 2003 (1) SA 472 (CC) para 28 c.f. I 
Currie & J De Waal op cit (note 234) 198. 
457 Roach K & Bunlender G op cit (note 385) 340; Liebenburg op cit (note 372) 391 c.f. Swanepoel P op cit (note 
236) 118. 
458 Ibid. 
459 EN v Government of the Republic of South Africa 2007 (1) BCLR 84 (D).  
460 Section 27 of the Constitution provides that ‘(a) Everyone has the right to have access to health care 
services, including reproductive health care (b) sufficient food and water; and (c) social security, including, if 
they are unable to support themselves and their dependants, appropriate social assistance.  
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve 
the progressive realisation of each of these rights.  
(3) No one may be refused emergency medical treatment’.  
 
Section 35(2)(e) further provides that ‘Everyone who is detained, including every sentenced prisoner, has the 
right to conditions of detention that are consistent with human dignity, including at least exercise and the 
provision, at state expense, of adequate accommodation, nutrition, reading material and medical treatment.’ 
461 EN v Government of the Republic of South Africa supra at 408 para 18 c.f. Swanepoel P op cit (note 236) 
120. 
462 EN v Government of the Republic of South Africa supra at 408 para 6, 18 and 32. 
463 EN v Government of the Republic of South Africa supra at 408 para 32 c.f. Swanepoel P op cit (note 236) 
121. 
464 Ibid. 
465 Ibid. 
466 EN v Government of the Republic of South Africa supra at 408 para 32 c.f. Swanepoel P op cit (note 236) 
120. 
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protection and promotion of their fundamental rights by the court.467 Furthermore, the court 
concluded that other infected prisoners seeking HIV treatment, would also benefit from the 
structural interdict issued, thus adding to the effectiveness of the remedy in this case.468 
 Swanepoel does however note some pitfalls in the EN judgment. He states that the deterrent 
component, which was indeed required in the circumstances of this case, was overlooked.469 
Moreover, the court failed to allow participation from the prisoners infected by HIV, as this 
would have ensured that varied interests were considered.470 
Lastly, the judgments471 of the SASSA saga concerned the delay in social assistance 
payments to grant beneficiaries. The court ultimately granted a strongly managerial remedy 
in the form of a structural interdict.472 This order was granted because of SASSA failing to 
retain plans to meet their payment obligations to social grant beneficiaries.473 The 
circumstances of this issue required urgent relief, since no payment of grants had grave 
consequences for many individuals who relied on the payment to survive.474 
The Constitutional Court,475 highlighted that it is essential for courts to retain their 
supervisory role until full vindication is achieved.476 If courts fail to retain their supervisory 
jurisdiction, state entities are likely to not comply with the orders of court and this will render 
the remedy ineffective for the poor and marginalised, who may not have access to the courts 
for addressing non-compliance.477 Therefore, Swanepoel argues that participation of parties 
and supervision by the court is vital for the effectiveness of a structural interdict.478  
The above-mentioned cases demonstrate circumstances under which urgent relief may be 
required. Moreover, it shows the need for the inclusion of a detailed mandatory interdict 
within a larger structural interdict, so that irreparable harm is avoided, and structural change 
is gradually achieved.479 
It is submitted that the structural interdict could potentially bring effective relief for cervical 
cancer patients. This is because the model is designed to ensure that actions and remedies are 
effectively carried out, under the supervision of the courts. Therefore, these elements would 
 
467 EN v Government of the Republic of South Africa supra at 408 para 18 c.f. Swanepoel P op cit (note 236) 
120. 
468 EN v Government of the Republic of South Africa supra at 408 para 4 and 35 c.f. Swanepoel P op cit (note 
236) 121. 
469 Swanepoel P op cit (note 236) 123. 
470 Ibid. 
471 Allpay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive Officer of the South African Social 
Security Agency 2014 (1) SA 604 (CC); Allpay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive 
Officer of the South African Social Security Agency (No 2) 2014 (4) SA 179 (CC); Black Sash Trust v Minister of 
Social Development 2017 ZACC 8 (CC). 
472 Black Sash Trust v Minister of Social Development 2017 ZACC 8 (CC) para 58 c.f. Swanepoel P op cit (note 
236) 129. 
473 Swanepoel P op cit (note 236) 127. 
474 Black Sash Trust v Minister of Social Development 2017 ZACC 8 (CC) para 58 c.f. Swanepoel P op cit (note 
236) 129. 
475 Allpay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive Officer of the South African Social 
Security Agency 2014 (1) SA 604 (CC).  
476 Swanepoel P op cit (note 236) 135. 
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be necessary to make certain that public health officials face the recommended disciplinary 
action.480 
 
4.3    Mandamus  
A mandamus is an order issued by the court, that declares the legal position on a particular 
matter in law and also instructs a party to act.481 The purpose of the mandamus is to regulate 
future conduct.482 Liebenburg argues, that a mandamus may be appropriate in bringing 
effective relief when socio-economic rights are infringed, as a result of the state’s failure to 
give effect to their positive obligation in realising such rights.483 
In regard to co-operation from public officials in realising socio-economic rights, Mbazira 
argues that a mandamus would not be necessary where compliance from the government is 
expected.484 In other words, where there is no evidence that public officials would not show 
compliance with a mere court order.485 Therefore, Swanepoel argues that a mandamus would 
then be an appropriate choice of relief where non-compliance by public officials is 
‘reasonably expected’.486 
However, there have been some instances where a mandamus has been granted even when 
compliance by the state was expected. This is illustrated in Minister of Health v TAC487, 
where the court granted a mandamus in the absence of evidence that the state would be non-
compliant.488 The court ordered a mandamus due to the urgent relief which was required to 
prevent irreparable harm being caused to infants at risk of HIV infection.489 
An additional feature of the mandamus that supports the requirement of urgent relief, is that 
when there is non-compliance, a mandamus may be followed by a contempt of court order.490 
A declaratory order, however, differs in this respect because it cannot be followed by a 
contempt of court order if non-compliance arises.491 
A pitfall to the mandamus in bringing appropriate and effective relief, is that this remedy 
requires further litigation when the initial mandamus is not complied with. The additional 
litigation when there is non-compliance, makes it difficult for the poor and marginalised 
groups of society to get effective relief from this remedy because it may difficult for them to 
access courts (eg. women).492 However, it is submitted, that these marginalised groups have 
the option of obtaining help from Legal Aid South Africa.493 
 
480 See Chapter Five for discussion on the recommended disciplinary action for KZN public health officials.  
481 Liebenburg op cit (note 372) 408. 
482 Liebenburg op cit (note 372) 409. 
483 Liebenburg op cit (note 372) 410 c.f. Swanepoel P op cit (note 236) 70. 
484 Mbazira op cit (note 244) 17. 
485 Mbazira op cit (note 244) 17 c.f. Swanepoel P op cit (note 236) 70. 
486 Swanepoel P op cit (note 236) 70. 
487 Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign supra at note 238.  
488 Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign supra at note 238 para 129. 
489 Swanepoel P op cit (note 236) 70. 
490 Fakie NO v CCII Systems (Pty) Ltd 2006 (4) SA 326 (SCA) para 38 c.f. Swanepoel P op cit (note 236) 70. 
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53 
 
4.3.1    Common Law damages  
Neethling et al describes a delict as a wrongful and culpable act which results in a harmful 
consequence.494 Damages is an element of a delictual action, since there must be some 
damage for which the law makes compensation available.495 Neethling et al goes on to define 
‘compensation’ as the ‘monetary equivalent of the damage caused’.496 In addition, the authors 
submit that the purpose of compensation is to place an aggrieved party in the position he/she 
would have been in, before the delict occurred.497 Damages aim to restore as fully as possible, 
the past and future loss of a person.498 They are always expressed in money.499 In addition to 
compensation for harm already suffered, they also cover payment for expected future loss.500 
The court defined damages in Van der Merwe v Road Accident Fund,501 as the detrimental 
impact on any patrimonial or non-patrimonial interest which the law has deemed worthy to 
protect.502 Damages can also be described as the decrease in the utility of an interest, due to 
an unexpected event.503  
A downfall to this common law remedy, is that it is limited to the law of prescription. 
Prescription will run as soon as the debt is due (i.e. a debt is due once the creditor can 
identify the debtor and the facts from which the debt arises) or when the creditor becomes 
aware of the existence of the debt504, for a period of three years for a delictual debt.505 
Prescription is also delayed for minors, in this case for dependants of cervical cancer victims, 
who are below 18.506 The prescription period will begin the day after a minor’s 18th 
birthday.507 
 
 
 
 
 
 
494 J Neethling, JM Potgieter & PJ Visser Law of Delict (2015) 221. 
495 Road Accident Fund v Krawa 2012 (2) SA 346 (ECG) para 2 c.f. Neethling, Potgieter & Visser op cit (note 442) 
221.  
496 Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Law of Damages (2012) 185 c.f. Neethling, Potgieter & Visser op cit (note 
442) 221.  
497 Neethling, Potgieter & Visser op cit (note 442) 221.  
498 Van der Merwe v Road Accident Fund (2006) (4) SA 230 para 252 c.f. Neethling, Potgieter & Visser op cit 
(note 442) 245.  
499 Radell v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund (1995) (4) SA 24 (A) c.f. Neethling, Potgieter & Visser op 
cit (note 442) 245.  
500 Neethling, Potgieter & Visser op cit (note 442) 245.  
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4.3.1.1    Patrimonial and non-patrimonial loss 
Patrimonial loss refers to a reduction in value of a positive asset or an increase in the negative 
patrimony of a person (eg. debt).508 In other words, it is the detrimental impact on any 
patrimonial loss for which the law offers protection.509 Furthermore, even a reduction in the 
utility of a right that is protected by law, is viewed as a patrimonial loss.510 This means that 
not only would a person’s ‘loss in profit’ be categorised as a patrimonial loss, but loss also 
includes a detrimental impact on a person’s earning capacity.511 
The Supreme Court of Appeal in Transnet v Sechaba512 applied the ‘sum-formula approach’ 
to determine the patrimonial loss of the claimant. This approach requires that the current 
patrimonial position of the claimant, be deducted from the position the claimant had been in 
before the harm occurred.513 
In addition to the above-mentioned approach, the courts are likely to apply the ‘once-and-for-
all rule’ which requires a claimant to state all their claims in a single cause of action.514 These 
claims should include harm already sustained, as well as harm expected in the future.515 An 
exception to this rule however is ‘where there is a continuing wrong that causes damage, 
there is a series of rights of action (damages) that manifests, and the plaintiff is not expected 
to claim once and for all’.516 
On the other hand, non-patrimonial loss is defined by Neethling et al as the ‘detrimental 
impact on personality rights, which are deemed valuable for protection by law and are rights 
that do not affect a person’s patrimony’.517 Similar to patrimonial loss, which can be seen as 
the reduction in utility of patrimonial interests, non-patrimonial can also be described as the 
reduction in utility of personality interests.518 The personality rights referred to include the 
right to dignity, privacy, identity, feelings, physical-mental integrity, liberty and one’s 
reputation.519 
A reduction in the quality or utility of a person’s personality interests implies that his/her 
affected interests, can no longer be used to fulfil the legally justifiable expectations of such 
person.520 
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509 Ibid.  
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518 Neethling, Potgieter & Visser op cit (note 442) 251. 
519 Van de Merwe v Road Accident Fund (2006) (4) SA 230 c.f. Neethling, Potgieter & Visser op cit (note 442) 
251. 
520 Neethling, Potgieter & Visser op cit (note 442) 251. 
 
55 
 
4.3.1.2     Subjective and objective elements of non-patrimonial loss 
Non-patrimonial loss consists of both an objective and a subjective element.521 The objective 
element refers to the recognisable or physical evidence of the loss incurred.522 An example of 
this objective external manifestation is when an individual is unconscious in hospital and 
cannot enjoy the usual amenities of his/her life, regardless of whether the individual is aware 
of this loss.523 
The subjective element deals with the loss that exists in the mind or the consciousness of an 
individual.524 Neethling et al explains that this element is formed by an individual’s reaction 
to the reduction of his/her personality interests.525 An example of this internal manifestation 
is the feeling of pain, which Neethling et al explains as the physical feeling of unhappiness, 
misery and/or injustice.526 These feelings are not capable of being assessed externally or 
objectively, since it experienced within an individual.527 
To determine non-patrimonial loss, one may make use of the ‘comparative method’.528 This 
method determines the loss incurred, by assessing the utility of quality concerning an 
individual’s relevant personality rights, before and after the delict occurred.529 In addition to 
this method, other evidence may also be gathered to determine the nature, intensity and 
duration of both the objective and subjective elements of the loss.530 
4.3.1.3     Relevant forms of non-patrimonial loss  
There are several forms of non-patrimonial loss, however it is submitted, that the following 
types are the most appropriate for the harm suffered by cervical cancer patients, during 2015 
– 2017.  
4.3.1.3.1    Pain and suffering  
This is the actual pain experienced by an individual, both physical and mental, as a result of 
the harm caused.531 It also includes the discomfort caused by bodily injury, emotional shock, 
as well as, medical treatment which had been necessitated by the injuries caused.532 These 
damages can be claimed by cervical cancer patients who have experienced this loss during 
2015 – 2017, because of the treatment being unavailable.  
4.3.1.3.2   Emotional shock  
Emotional shock is mainly associated with pain and suffering, that in turn may also cause 
other forms of loss such as insomnia, depression, anxiety neuros, hysteria and other forms of 
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mental or physical conditions.533 The shock must also have an impact on the physical or 
mental health of the plaintiff, and not just affect the individual for a short period of time.534 It 
is submitted that this type of loss could be claimed by cervical cancer patients, who have 
experienced emotional shock and the above manifestations of this type of loss.  
4.3.1.3.3    Shortened expectation of life  
This form of loss is when an individual’s natural life expectancy is shortened and is usually 
taken into consideration as a loss of amenity.535 It is submitted that this type of loss may be 
relevant to cervical cancer patients who once had curable cervical cancer, but has now 
advanced to a terminal stage, due to a delay in treatment during the 2015 - 2017.  
4.3.1.3.4     Loss of support 
Common law provides that where a person has wrongfully caused the death of another, the 
dependants of the deceased are entitled to claim for loss of support sustained, as a result of 
the deceased’s death.536 The basis of the claim is that dependants have lost support due to the 
death of a breadwinner, who was under a legal duty to provide for the dependants during his 
lifetime.537 
An example of dependants would be a wife and children, who have a legal right to be 
maintained, until a child becomes self-supporting.538 In addition, actual, accrued and 
prospective patrimonial loss must be established because of the death of a breadwinner.539 It 
is submitted that this type of loss is relevant in respect of individuals who have lost their 
breadwinner has a result of delayed oncology treatment, who would have otherwise survived, 
had treatment been available.   
4.3.1.3.5     Grief  
In the recent cases of Komape540 and Life Esidimeni541 there has been a call for the 
development of common law, to allow for payment of damages for grief in addition to trauma 
and emotional shock, without showing that such grief had a psychiatric effect on the 
claimant.542 This change would set a precedent for future cases.543 
 
533 Visser & Potgieter op cit (note 481) 100 c.f. Neethling, Potgieter & Visser op cit (note 442) 246. 
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It is submitted that should such precedent be set, there will also be a possible claim for 
dependants who have suffered grief as a result of losing their loved one at the hands of public 
health officials, who have failed to uphold their constitutional duties.  
 
4.4.  Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) 
Following the success of the Life Esidimeni arbitration hearing, it would be useful to discuss 
alternative dispute resolution, particularly, the mechanism used in the Life Esidimeni hearing 
ie. arbitration. 
Around the globe, jurisdictions have become more and more accepting of the reality, that in 
certain instances, court proceedings may not always be the most appropriate method to solve 
civil disputes.544 The South African Law Reform Commission has also recommended that 
ADR procedures be used to resolve civil disputes.545 The Commission stated that this change 
will enhance access to justice.546  
Peté et al provide the fundamental objectives of the ADR process as follows: 
1. Cost-cutting  
Disputes that are resolved using ADR mechanisms are more efficient and cost-effective than 
accessing the court system.547 Negotiation and mediation are the most cost-effective of all the 
ADR mechanisms.548 
2. ADR facilitates co-operative and participatory dispute settlement 
ADR procedures encourage a ‘dialogue-based culture’, particularly when there are diverse 
nterests and contentious issues in dispute.549 The nature of the co-operative mechanisms in 
ADR enable parties to work together with a neutral party, to develop a mutually acceptable 
remedy.550 
3. ADR aids access to justice  
Effective use of the ADR process offers a more affordable option to parties and quickens the 
resolution of disputes.551 These features make the procedure more accessible to the public. 
4. ADR relieves court congestion  
Studies conducted on case-flow management in South African courts show that court-rolls 
are often congested and as a result, cases take lengthy periods of time to litigate.552 
It is also important to note that alternative dispute resolution is an interest-based approach, 
and not a rights-based approach. 
 
544 S Pete & D Hulme et al Civil Procedure: A practical guide (2016) 501.  
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547 N Melville ‘Has ombudsmania reached South Africa? The burgeoning role of ombudsman in commercial 
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4.4.1   Types of ADR Procedures  
Peté et al states that ‘ADR means any procedure, other than litigation or civil application 
procedures that may be used to resolve civil disputes’.553 ADR mechanisms include, but are 
not limited to, negotiation, conciliation, mediation, arbitration or a combination of any of 
these procedures.554 ADR also includes the option of hybrid ADR procedures. Hybrid ADR 
procedures are a blend of different ADR mechanisms.555 These procedures may be useful 
when no single ADR mechanism is suitable to resolve a dispute.556 Common hybrid ADR 
procedures include, a Mini-trial, Mediation-Arbitration, Arbitration-Mediation, Mediation-
Reconciliation and MEDALOA.557 
For the purpose of this research paper only arbitration will be discussed, owing to the recent 
success of its use in the Life Esidimeni hearing. All other ADR procedures are beyond the 
scope of this dissertation.558 
 
4.4.2   Arbitration  
The arbitration procedure is adjudicated by an arbitrator, who fulfils a role that is similar to a 
judge in the court.559 The arbitrator is an independent third party who hears oral evidence, 
written evidence and arguments.560 He/she then makes a decision based on the evidence and 
by considering the applicable law.561  
The decision made at an arbitration hearing is called an award.562 Despite the resemblance 
between a court hearing and an arbitration, it still falls under the ADR procedures.563 This is 
because arbitration falls outside the public court process, which is enabled by section 34564 of 
the Constitution.565 
A written arbitration agreement is regulated by the Arbitration Act.566 The Act allows for an 
award to be made an order of the High Court, in terms of section 31(1).567 This order then 
becomes binding on all individuals, including state mechanisms.568 Conversely, an award 
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granted at an arbitration hearing cannot be enforced by the arbitrator unless it is made an 
order of court.569 
 
4.4.3   Advantages of arbitration over other ADR procedures  
The advantage of arbitration over the court procedure and other existing ADR mechanisms is 
that firstly, arbitration begins timeously whereas litigation usually takes lengthy periods of 
time due to legal rules and technicalities.570 These rules and technicalities are relaxed during 
an arbitration hearing.571  
Secondly, the arbitrator appointed for a dispute is usually experienced in the specific field, 
that is in issue.572 Hence, unlike a judge who may not have such specific knowledge, the 
arbitrator possesses a better understanding, skill and experience of the matter in dispute.573 
This expertise could lead to a more effective solution.  
Thirdly, the arbitration process is usually neutral in nature since the arbitrator is an 
independent third party.574 In some hearings however, the rules may allow for parties to select 
the arbitrator.575 Finally, arbitration is generally confidential and more cost-effective than any 
other civil court procedure.576  
 
4.4.4   Disadvantages of ADR procedures  
A disadvantage of using an ADR mechanism is that a party is at risk of incurring double-
costs.577 Since there is no guarantee that the ADR mechanism will resolve a dispute, a party 
would have to seek normal litigation at court which will require further time and costs, if the 
dispute is unresolved after ADR.578 Another disadvantage of ADR is that a claim could 
prescribe during an ongoing ADR procedure, which should be avoided when there is a danger 
of prescription.579 This would render the parties unable to resolve their dispute in a court, 
should the ADR procedure fail. 
4.4.4.1   Life Esidimeni Arbitration hearing  
As previously mentioned, arbitration was used in the Life Esidimeni hearing and the 
arbitrator appointed was Former Deputy Chief Justice, Dikgang Moseneke.580 Given the 
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tragic nature of the Life Esidimeni dispute, the arbitration hearing allowed the curators of 
survivors and families of the deceased patients, an opportunity to relay their experience.581 
Similarly, the hearing also allowed public health officials an opportunity to account for their 
actions and demonstrate their remorse to the affected families.582  
After hearing all testimony, the arbitrator considered the evidence before him and concluded 
that the decision by the Gauteng Department of Health to terminate their contract with Life 
Esidimeni Care Centre was irrational, unconstitutional and led to suffering and deaths of 
mental health care patients.583 The arbitrator was empowered to award both general and 
constitutional damages, which amounted to a successful award of 1.2 million rand per 
claimant.584 
It is submitted, that given the cost-effective and impartial nature of an arbitration hearing, it 
could be instrumental in providing relief to cervical cancer patients and, would also prevent 
years of future litigation.  
 
4.5   Conclusion  
This chapter sought to emphasise the need for appropriate and effective relief in cases 
involving socio-economic right violations. This relief is particularly important in an unequal 
society like South Africa, that is plagued by poverty.585 It also considered what constitutes 
appropriate and effective relief in cases of systemic right violations. 
The first part of this chapter focused on two constitutional remedies that are available to 
cervical cancer patients. It identified the circumstances under which constitutional damages 
and a structural interdict, may constitute appropriate and effective relief. In addition, this 
chapter discussed the participatory model of the structural interdict proposed by Swanepoel, 
specifically for socio-economic rights cases. Further this chapter proposed the potential of 
combining the participatory model of a structural interdict with damages, in cases that require 
urgent relief and structural changes, similar to the oncology crisis.  
The second part of the chapter dealt with two common law remedies that are available to 
cervical cancer patients, who have suffered harm during 2015-2017, as a result of the 
oncology crisis. It discussed the mandamus and common law damages as remedies in the 
context of socio-economic right cases. It also evaluated some advantages and pitfalls of each 
remedy, as well as how courts have granted these remedies.  
This chapter concludes by discussing arbitration as an ADR mechanism. It highlighted the 
use of arbitration in the Life Esidimeni hearing. The hearing resulted in a successful award of 
damages for mental health care patients and the deceased families. In addition, the features of 
arbitration were evaluated to determine its usefulness for cervical cancer patients. 
 
the-legal-basis-for-granting-the-award  (accessed on 24 September 2018). See also 3.3.1.2 for discussion on 
the Life Esidimeni hearing.  
581 Toxopeüs M ‘Life Esidimeni hearing’op cit (note 530).  
582 Ibid. 
583 Ibid. 
584 Ibid. 
585 Swanepoel P op cit (note 236) 185. 
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From this chapter it is clear that there are various options available to cervical cancer patients, 
who wish to seek restitution for their violated constitutional rights. However, the relief 
chosen must be considered the most effective and legitimate by the affected persons. It is 
submitted, that the remedy which would constitute effective and appropriate relief for 
cervical cancer patients is common law damages, as well as, a structural interdict. The reason 
for these recommendations will be discussed further in chapter six. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: WHO CAN BE HELD LIABLE FOR HARM CAUSED TO 
CERVICAL CANCER PATIENTS OR THEIR DEPENDANTS 
 
5.1   Introduction  
This chapter will commence by identifying the public health officials who should be held 
liable for their actions, that have contributed to the breakdown of oncology services in the 
KZN public health sector.586 
The report on the irregularities surrounding the appointment of the service provider (KZN 
Oncology Inc), was submitted to the SAHRC by Medical Rights Advocacy Network 
(MeRAN).587 The MeRAN report evaluated the actions of public health officials, to 
determine their individual contributions to the breakdown of oncology machines at 
Addington Hospital.588 In addition, the report predominantly summarised information 
gathered by the KZN Treasury, who investigated procurement irregularities relating to the 
appointment of KZN Oncology Inc.589 
This chapter will go on to detail the view of various authors, particularly DA MPL590 Dr 
Imran Keeka, who has been a key individual in raising awareness on the concerns of public 
health officials’ actions. As mentioned previously, Dr Keeka initially brought a written 
complaint to the SAHRC, reporting on the condition of oncology services in KZN.591 
The actions of public health officials in the KZN Department of Health that will be discussed 
include, the Minister of Health, the MEC of Health in KZN, the sole proprietor of KZN 
Oncology Inc, the General Manager of supply chain management, the Head of Department 
(HoD) who also held the position of Accounting Officer, the Chief Financial Officer and 
other senior members of management in the KZN Department of Health.592 
 
5.2   Breakdown of machines and change of service provider  
Before the actions of the KZN public health officials are discussed, it is important to 
highlight the circumstances that led to the oncology crisis. Therefore, a summary regarding 
the maintenance of the oncology machines at Addington Hospital is required. 
Following the breakdown of two oncology machines at Addington, owing to a refusal by the 
KZN Health Department to make payment to the original service provider Tecmed, a new 
company, KZN Oncology Inc whose sole proprietor is a former employee of the KZN 
 
586 It is important to note that the actions considered will be those carried out during the research period of 
this dissertation ie. 2015 – 2017. 
587 ‘MeRAN Report on Kwa-Zulu Natal Addington Hospital, Durban, oncology machine scandal’ 2018 
(unpublished) 18.  
588 Ibid.  
589 Ibid. 
590 Member of the Provincial Legislature (MPL).  
591 See 1.1 for discussion on Dr. Imran Keeka’s submission to the South African Human Rights Commission.  
592 It is important to note that this chapter refers to those individuals holding these positions during 2015-
2017.  
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Department of Health, was awarded a tender.593 The tender was awarded for repair and 
maintenance of two Varian machines.594 The tender was also awarded at a higher amount, 
which was double the amount initially quoted by Tecmed, the authorised service provider for 
the Varian machines.595 
KZN Oncology Inc was not authorised to repair or maintain these machines, which had been 
confirmed by Varian, the sole provider of the oncology machines.596 In the appointment of 
KZN Oncology Inc, the Health Technology Services (HTS) were not consulted, and various 
laws and regulations were breached following the employment of KZN Oncology Inc.597  
The attempt at repair of machines by KZN Oncology Inc resulted in one of the Varian 
machines operating only for a short period, while the other machine was damaged by the 
company’s technicians who cannibalized parts from the first machine to repair the second 
machine.598 Further, the repair was conducted before a contract was concluded between the 
KZN Department of Health and KZN Oncology Inc.599 
Due to the irregular actions by public health officials in KZN, there have been delays in the 
provision of oncology treatment.600 Therefore, many cancer patients have died as a result of 
not receiving treatment timeously.601 Many of these cancer deaths have been of patients 
diagnosed with cervical cancer, owing to the lack of radiotherapy treatment, because of 
dysfunctional machines.602  
The breakdown of machines at Addington led to the backlog of patients at Albert Luthuli 
Central Hospital and Addington Hospital. In effect, this has led to a breakdown of oncology 
services in KZN as a whole. 
The grossly irregular actions of public health officials who held these positions during 2015 -
2017 in the KZN Department of Health are detailed as follows: 
 
5.3   National Minister of Health and Department of Health Premier of KZN  
MeRAN submits that the Minister of Health and the KZN Premier who should be overseers 
of the Department of Health, seemingly ignore their responsibilities imposed on them as 
political bearers by the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.603 This responsibility is 
 
593 MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 2-3. 
594 Ibid. 
595 Ibid. 
596 KZN Treasury Report on the procurement irregularities relating to KZN Oncology Inc para 18.2.12 – 18.2.13 
c.f. MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 20. 
597 MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 23. 
598 MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 24. 
599 Ibid. 
600 MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 35. 
601 Ibid. 
602 MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 36. 
603 MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 27. 
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imposed on the Premier by section 125604, and on the Minister of Health in terms of section 
85605 of the Constitution.606 
 
5.3.1   National Minister of Health – KZN Department of Health 
The Minister of Health has publicly stated to the National Health Portfolio Committee, that 
the reason for the malfunctioning machines was due to a lack of necessary skills by the Head 
of Department/Accounting officer, to manage the KZN Department of Health.607 This was 
alleged by the Minister of Health, despite contradictory evidence which shows that the 
appointment of KZN Oncology Inc, an entity that was not qualified to repair the two 
machines, was done through deliberate action by senior management who bypassed 
procurement procedures.608 
It is submitted, that the Minister of Health overlooked the corrupt actions of public health 
officials in KZN, in procuring the services of KZN Oncology Inc. Instead, the Minister stated 
that the collapse of oncology services was due to a ‘lack of skill’.609 
Further, during a presentation to Parliament, the Minister failed to provide Parliament with 
important information on the irregular contract awarded to KZN Oncology Inc, for the 
attempted repair and maintenance of two machines at Addington Hospital.610 In addition, he 
did not make available to Parliament the findings of the KZN Treasury Report which 
evaluated the irregular contract, all of which was within the Minister’s knowledge.611 
As previously mentioned, MeRAN points out that the Minister misled the National Health 
Portfolio Committee, by placing the blame on the Health Technology Services (HTS), 
commenting on their lack of the requisite capacity.612 However, it is evident from the findings 
of the KZN Treasury Report and MeRAN, that HTS had never been involved in the 
appointment of KZN Oncology Inc and were completely bypassed during the process.613 
Furthermore, MeRAN’s findings show that it was HTS who stood firm and refused to 
condone the gross corruption that surrounded the procurement of KZN Oncology Inc.614 
Lastly, according to HTS, the National Health Minister failed to inform the National Health 
Portfolio Committee that it was Addington Hospital that committed the Department of Health 
to the irregular contract with KZN Oncology Inc, which the KZN Treasury has deemed as an 
irregular expenditure.615 
 
604 The Constitution (note 76) Section 125. 
605 For Minister’s responsibilities see also - The Constitution (note 76) Section 92(3). 
606 MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 27. 
607 MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 31. 
608 Ibid. 
609 Ibid. 
610 Ibid. 
611 Ibid. 
612 Ibid. 
613 Ibid. 
614 Ibid. 
615 Ibid. 
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MeRAN is of the view that the National Health Minister should account for why he misled 
the National Parliament, by placing false blame on the HTS for supply-chain management 
issues.616 Further, he must be questioned on why he concealed the KZN Treasury Report, 
when he made his presentation to the National Health Portfolio Committee.617 
In light of the findings of the KZN Treasury and MeRAN, it is submitted that the Minister 
should be held liable for breaching section 85 of the Constitution. It provides that the 
Minister must ensure that national legislation and policy is fulfilled, which includes health 
legislation that promotes access to healthcare.618  
Moreover, it is the responsibility of the Minister to act in accordance with the Constitution 
and furnish Parliament with detailed and regular reports concerning matters that are under his 
supervision.619Therefore, the Minister must be held liable for his failure to present to 
Parliament an accurate report on the state of oncology services in KZN, misleading the 
National Portfolio Committee on the cause for the malfunctioning machines, excluding the 
KZN Treasury report during his presentation to Parliament, and for placing false blame on 
HTS.  
It is submitted that the above actions constitute a breach of section 92 (a) and (b) of the 
Constitution, and the Minister should therefore face a disciplinary hearing for failing to 
uphold his constitutional obligations. He should also bear collective responsibility for the 
mismanagement of the oncology services as recommended by MeRAN and be held liable to 
pay damages620 to cervical cancer patients and their dependants, who suffered harm as result 
of his failure to take effective steps to prevent the breakdown of machines.  
 
5.3.2   Premier of KZN  
‘MeRAN also points out that in terms of section 133(2)621 of the Constitution, the 
Premier and the Provincial Executive Council bear collective responsibility for 
this gross mismanagement of oncology services and the deaths of patients which 
have resulted from it.’622 
It is submitted, that the Premier of KZN should face a disciplinary hearing for his failure to 
comply with the constitutional obligation, imposed on him by section 125 of the Constitution. 
He should also be held personally liable to pay damages to cervical cancer patients and their 
dependants, who suffered harm during 2015 – 2017 as a result of the Premier’s failure to 
effectively manage the KZN Health Department, which has resulted in numerous cervical 
cancer deaths. These damages should be in the form of pain and suffering, emotional shock, 
 
616 MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 39. 
617 MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 31. 
618 The Constitution (note 76) Section 85(2)(a)-(b).  
619 The Constitution (note 76) Section 95(a)-(b).  
620 The relevant forms of damages include, but are not limited to pain and suffering, emotional shock, reduced 
expectancy of life and loss of support for dependants of deceased patients. 
621 The Constitution (note 76) Section 133(2). 
622 MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 37.  
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reduced expectancy of life and loss of support for dependants of cervical cancer patients who 
have died.623 
 
5.4   Member of Executive Council (MEC) for KZN Department of Health 
The MEC for Health in KZN has continually provided false information on the issues 
concerning the oncology machines, oncology staff and the waiting periods for oncology 
treatment.624 Dr Imran Keeka (DA Health Spokesman), argues that the MEC’s lack of interest 
and concern for resolving the breakdown of oncology services in KZN, has contributed to a 
backlog in treatment and deaths.625 
Keeka states further, that the breakdown of oncology services in KZN did not happen 
‘overnight’, nor did it happen under the sole supervision of the HoD/accounting officer.626 
Keeka also takes the view that the HoD is being used as a scapegoat, to take blame for the 
political bungle consisting of other public health officials, including the MEC for Health.627 
The South African Medical Association (SAMA) chairperson, Dr Mzukisi Grootboom, also 
echoed the opinion of Dr. Keeka, in his statement concerning the MEC for Health in KZN. 
He expressed that if the suspended HoD is to be held accountable for the state of oncology 
services in KZN, then his political leaders which include the MEC and Premiers, should also 
be held accountable.628 
MeRAN also argues that responses received from the MEC have been marked with several 
damning inconsistences.629 Firstly, MeRAN received a written response from the MEC in 
February 2017, concerning an internal investigation conducted by the Department into the 
procurement irregularities, misrepresentation and tax evasion (amongst other things) by 
Tecmed.630 The MEC alleged that a criminal case had been opened with the South African 
Police Services (SAPS), and that Tecmed was being investigated by the National Treasury, 
Asset Forfeiture Unit, the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) and SAPS.631 Despite these 
allegations by the MEC, the National Treasury stated that they were never investigating 
Tecmed and was only aware of an internal investigated conducted by the KZN Department of 
Health.632 Therefore such allegations by the MEC were proved to be false by the 
investigation conducted by MeRAN. 
 
623 McQuoid-Mason DJ, ‘Public health officials and MECs should be held liable for harm caused to patients 
through incompetence, indifference, maladministration or negligence regarding the availability of hospital 
equipment’ (2016) 106 (7) The South African Medical Journal (SAMJ) 681. 
624 Imran Keeka ‘#KZNOncologyCrisis: SAHRC must not allow MEC Dhlomo to escape justice’, accessed from 
http://www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-analysis/sahrc-must-not-allow-mec-dhlomo-to-escape-justice- 
(accessed on 10 December 2018).  
625 Ibid.  
626 SAHRC ‘Calls mount for KZN health MEC to be held accountable’ 16 November 2017 accessed from 
https://www.sahrc.org.za/index.php/sahrc-media/news/item/993-calls-mount-for-kzn-health-mec-to-be-held-
accountable (accessed on 1 Nov 2018).  
627 Ibid.  
628 Ibid.  
629 MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 14. 
630 MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 15. 
631 Ibid. 
632 MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 15. 
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In the absence of any evidence of the allegations against Tecmed, the Department of Health 
refused to make payment to Tecmed for maintenance of the Varian machines.633 As a result, 
the Department has put the lives of many cancer patients at risk, including cervical cancer 
patients, because there had been no upkeep of oncology machines.634 The department has also 
probably condemned hundreds of cancer patients to death, by their failure to provide life-
saving treatment timeously.635 
MeRAN notes that in 2015, the MEC appeared before the Provincial Public Accounts 
Committee, stating yet again that there were three cases which had been opened against 
Tecmed, relating to procurement irregularities.636 However, the case numbers provided by the 
MEC were reviewed by MeRAN against the records of SAPS, and the case numbers did 
correlate with investigations into procurement irregularities.637 The case numbers had instead 
been linked to other crimes.638 
It is important to note, that notwithstanding several claims by the MEC relating to corruption 
against Tecmed since 2012, Tecmed still remains on the National Treasury Data base.639 
Furthermore, the company continues to service a machine at Greys Hospital and Tecmed has 
never been criminally charged or convicted of any crime.640 The company is also the only 
authorised service provider for Varian (ie. supplier of the machines at Addington Hospital).641 
In addition, MeRAN also questions why the allegations of irregularities relating to Tecmed 
only arose when payment for maintenance was due (ie. after the first year of free services).642 
It has been brought to the knowledge of MeRAN, that Tecmed had continued maintaining the 
machines at Addington Hospital, for several months without any payment.643 
This then leads to the inquiry of what happened to the millions of rands that had been 
provided by central government, specifically for a five-year maintenance contract with 
Tecmed.644 
In their submission to the SAHRC, MeRAN suggested that the MEC (and other members of 
management) must be answerable for his actions and provide evidence as to why he led the 
public to believe the machines at Addington Hospital were old.645 Furthermore, the MEC 
should be questioned on the conflicting stories, which he divulged to the National Health 
Portfolio Committee about the criminal investigations against Tecmed.646 Lastly, he should 
 
633 MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 18. 
634 Ibid. 
635 Ibid. 
636 MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 16. 
637 Ibid. 
638 Ibid – There had also been statements put out in May 2013 by the MEC for Health during a press 
conference, where he stated that he had presented Varian (ie. supplier of the machines) with a detailed report 
into the investigations of irregularities with the company. MeRAN points out that a copy of such a report has 
never surfaced.  
639 MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 15. 
640 Ibid. 
641 MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 18. 
642 MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 17. 
643 Ibid. 
644 MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 17. 
645 MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 38. 
646 Ibid. 
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be held accountable for his claim that investigations against Tecmed has been completed, but 
never provided any evidence to support this claim.647 
McQuoid-Mason suggests that the MEC and other public health officials involved in the 
crisis, should be held personally liable for the harm caused to cancer patients.648 He adds that 
they should be sued in their personal capacity where there has been incompetence, 
maladministration, indifference and negligence by members of management in the KZN 
Department of Health.649 
It is submitted that in light of the MEC’s lack of interest in resolving the oncology crisis, he 
should be held liable for providing false information on the authorised service provider ie. 
Tecmed on several occasions, failing to hold the public health officials accountable for not 
ensuring that the Varian machines were maintained by ending the contract with Tecmed, and 
providing conflicting information on the state of the Varian Machines and waiting periods for 
treatment to the public of Kwa-Zulu Natal.  
The MEC failed to take immediate steps to resolve the oncology crisis (ie. renew the 
warranty with Tecmed and prevent backlogs with several hospitals in KZN). Therefore, he is 
breach of section 133(3) of the Constitution which requires members of Executive Council to 
act in accordance with the Constitution, as well as, uphold the ethics650 that is prescribed by 
National Legislation.651 
It is submitted that the MEC be held personally liable for the pain and suffering, emotional 
shock, reduced expectancy of life for cervical cancer patients, who suffered harm during 
2015 – 2017. Further, the dependants of cervical cancer patients who have passed on as a 
result of delayed treatment during the oncology crisis should also be able to claim.  
Furthermore, as previously discussed, there have been recommendations from MeRAN, the 
SAHRC, and other concerned writers, who stated that public health officials in the KZN 
Department of Health must face disciplinary action for their conduct which has led to the 
deaths and progressed cervical cancer of many women in KZN. However, there is no 
evidence to show that the MEC has carried out these actions.  
It is submitted that a structural interdict652 should be issued against the MEC to ensure that he 
institutes disciplinary action against the relevant public health officials. He should also report 
back to the court on his progress. The court’s supervision would be necessary in this case 
because of the non-compliance the MEC has shown, during the oncology crisis.  
It is further submitted, that the MEC did not act in the interests of the cervical cancer patients 
and failed to act in accordance with the ethical standards of his profession. Therefore, he 
should also face a disciplinary hearing by the HPCSA. 
 
647 Ibid – These claims were made in November 2014.  
648 DJ McQuoid-Mason, ‘Public health officials and MECs for health should be held criminally liable for causing 
the death of cancer patients through their intentional or negligent conduct that results in oncology equipment 
not working in hospitals’ (2017) 10 (2) SAJBL 83. 
649 Ibid.  
650 The Constitution (note 76) Section 136(1).  
651 The Constitution (note 76) Section 133(3).  
652 See 4.2.3 for discussion on the Structural Interdict.  
 
69 
 
5.5    Sole Proprietor of KZN Oncology Inc for KZN Department of Health 
KZN Oncology Inc is an entity registered to Dr Nkanyiso Zwane, who completed his medical 
training as an oncologist at the KZN Department of Health, before starting his private 
practice at Parklands Hospital.653 Dr Zwane is the sole proprietor of KZN Oncology Inc.654 
MeRAN reports that due to the continued failure of the Department of Health to maintain the 
Varian machines at Addington Hospital, the sole proprietor of KZN Oncology Inc offered the 
services of his company to the KZN Department of Health, to repair and maintain two 
machines at Addington Hospital.655 The quotation offered by KZN Oncology Inc was double 
the cost of the quote given by TecMed, who were the authorised service providers.656 
As previously mentioned, the intervention by KZN Oncology Inc during early August 2015 
resulted in one Varian machine working intermittently, and the other machine rendered 
irreparable by the end of 2016.657 KZN Oncology Inc only registered with the Companies’ 
Registration Body (CIPC) on 25 August 2015 (after conducting repairs on the machine), and 
was issued with a temporary registration number as a supplier on the KZN Provincial 
Treasury Database on 21 September 2015.658 The company was not registered as a VAT 
vendor.659 
The attempted repair of the Varian machines was conducted by Oncology Services 
International (OSI), technicians employed by KZN Oncology Inc.660 According to the 
Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) of the HTS, repair of machines should only be 
conducted by the sole provider of the machine, that in this case is Varian.661 The SOP also 
states that any deviation from this general rule of practice, must be done in consultation with 
HTS.662 However, as mentioned previously, the HTS had been deliberately bypassed, 
according to the investigation conducted by the KZN Treasury.663 
In addition, KZN Oncology Inc sourced their technicians from OSI Switzerland, to conduct 
the repair of machines at Addington Hospital.664 This was allowed by the KZN Public Health 
officials despite the objection from the supplier of the machines, Varian Medical Systems 
International, who confirmed in writing that OSI was not authorised to ‘service, provide parts 
and maintain Varian oncology equipment’.665 This correspondence from Varian was given to 
the HTS on 21 August 2015.666 
 
653 MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 18. 
654 Ibid. 
655 MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 3. 
656 Ibid. 
657 Ibid – See also 4.2 for discussion on breakdown of machines in Addington Hospital.  
658 KZN Treasury Report para 18.1 c.f. MeRAN Report op cit (note 528) 8.  
659 Ibid. 
660 MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 18. 
661 MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 20. 
662 MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 20. 
663 KZN Treasury Report para 18.2.11 c.f. MeRAN Report op cit (note 528) 20. 
664 Ibid. 
665 Ibid. 
666 Ibid. 
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MeRAN notes, that the intervention by KZN Oncology Inc has resulted in the need of a new 
Varian machine needing to be replaced at great cost to taxpayers, and the second machine 
still requiring to be repaired at the time of their report.667 
It is submitted that the sole proprietor of KZN Oncology Inc should be held liable for 
breaching various standard operating procedures, by offering the services of his company to 
conduct repairs on the Varian machines, despite being aware of HTS’ disapproval of the 
company, who stated that the company was not authorised or equipped to repair and maintain 
the machines.668  
The company is also in breach of the Hazardous Substances Act669 which provides that 
individuals must be authorised to handle Group IV (four) hazardous equipment, since their 
technicians handled the Varian machines which contain nuclear material and fall under group 
IV.670 The regulations also provide that individuals who handle hazardous equipment, must 
ensure that other persons are not exposed to the ionising radiation.671 The sole proprietor 
could also be liable to pay a fine or imprisonment, for failing to comply with these 
regulations.672 
It is submitted, that due to the sole proprietor’s conscious actions to offer the services of KZN 
Oncology Inc, even though he was aware that the company was unauthorised to conduct the 
repair and maintenance of the Varian machines, he should be held personally liable to 
cervical cancer patients for the harm suffered during 2015 - 2017. This is because the sole 
proprietor continued with his actions, despite having reasonable foresight that it could affect 
the treatment of cervical cancer patients in KZN.  
Further, it is submitted, that the sole proprietor of KZN Oncology Inc should be held 
personally liable in damages for pain and suffering, emotional shock, loss of support for 
dependants of patients who have died and reduced life expectancy. This will help alleviate 
the negative impact on the public purse673 and possibly deter future actions of public health 
officials, that infringe on the right of access to health care.  
Lastly, it is important to note that the sole proprietor of KZN Oncology Inc, as previously 
mentioned, is also a medical practitioner. Therefore, he has an obligation to act according to 
the medical ethics that his profession prescribes and serve the best interests of the patients. 
However, he has acted contrary to the professional standards and should therefore face a 
disciplinary hearing by the Health Professions Council of South Africa (HPCSA). 
 
5.6    Head of Department (HoD) for KZN Department of Health 
Following their investigations, the KZN Treasury was informed that the HoD refused to 
renew the extended warranty, after the first year of the maintenance contract with Tecmed.674 
 
667 MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 34. 
668 See 5.2 for discussion on Health Technology Services’ disapproval of the appointment KZN Oncology Inc.  
669 Hazardous Substances Act 15 of 1973.  
670 Regulations relating to Group IV Hazardous Substances (1993) Chapter 2.  
671 Regulations relating to Group IV Hazardous Substances (1993) Chapter 4 Regulation 18(2)(b) and 21(1).  
672 The Hazardous Act ibid (note 619) Section 19. 
673 See 4.3.1.1 for discussion by Sturm on the impact for the public purse.  
674 KZN Treasury Report para 18.2.1 – 18.2.5 c.f. MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 19. 
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This decision by the HoD contradicts what she alleged in December 2012, where the HoD 
stated that there was no evidence of a maintenance contract with Tecmed, during a press 
report.675 According to the KZN Treasury Report, payment to Tecmed had stopped because 
no health official from the Department had signed the maintenance contract, which had 
already been compiled.676  
The HoD also relayed to the media that the Varian machines were ‘old’.677 MeRAN argues 
that the HoD had not bothered to check the date of manufacture on both machines, which was 
easily accessible, because documentation confirmed that they were new machines.678  
In addition, the HoD issued a notice blacklisting Tecmed.679 The reason provided by the HoD 
for this decision was that supply chain abuse was still under investigation.680 Despite this 
allegation, as previously mentioned, Tecmed is still the service provider for other Varian 
machines (including a machine at Grey’s Hospital).681 
It is submitted that the misleading responses by the HoD on several occasions, including her 
refusal to sign the extended warranty contract with Tecmed, has put the lives of many 
cervical cancer patients at risk.682 Furthermore, in the absence of any proof regarding the 
allegations surrounding Tecmed, the accused is innocent until proven guilty in our 
constitutional democracy.683 
It is submitted that the HoD should be held liable for refusing to renew the warranty with 
Tecmed and backlisting the company, which has had direct impact on the breakdown of 
Varian machines and the unauthorised appointment of KZN Oncology Inc. Therefore, she 
should be held personally liable for damages in the form of pain and suffering, emotional 
shock, reduced life expectancy and loss of support by the dependants of cervical cancer 
patients who have suffered harm, as a result of the HoD failing to renew the contract with 
TecMed. 
In addition, her conduct during the oncology crisis did not conform to the standard set by the 
health profession. As a medical practitioner, she owes a duty to the society to promote access 
 
675 MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 15 - ‘MeRAN was informed that a copy of the contract had subsequently 
been supplied to the department and, an unsigned copy of the contract subsequently surfaced’. In the same 
press report (2012) the HoD also alleged that criminal investigations into the procurement irregularities were 
conducted, and several staff members had been fired in connection with the KZN Oncology tender. MeRAN 
reports that the question of which individuals had been fired and whether they faced criminal sanctions, 
remain unanswered.  
Further, the HoD provided that the machines were being investigated to determine if they had been 
intentionally broken.’ 
676 KZN Treasury Report para 18.2.1 – 18.2.5 c.f. MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 18. 
677 MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 16. 
678 Ibid - It is also important to note that in Feb 2010, a medical physicist of the KZN Health Department 
verified both machines when they were purchased and would have determined if they had not been new 
machines. 
679 MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 16. 
680 Ibid. 
681 MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 16. 
682 MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 17-18. 
683 Ibid. 
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to healthcare684, which she has failed to fulfil. Therefore, the HoD should face a disciplinary 
hearing by the HPCSA. 
 
5.7   Head of Department/Accounting Officer for KZN Department of Health 
On 7 July 2015, the sole director of KZN Oncology Inc requested that the accounting officer 
(who is also the head of department), allow a field service engineer from KZN Oncology Inc, 
to ‘evaluate, quote and possibly repair’ two Varian machines at Addington Hospital.685 
MeRAN notes that the request by KZN Oncology Inc was made before the company was 
registered with CIPC or the provincial treasury database.686 These requests were condoned by 
the accounting officer, who allowed the use of their services.687 The sole director of KZN 
Oncology Inc also claimed that they were able to offer ‘world class warranty services’.688 
According to the MeRAN report on 10 July 2015, the Accounting officer notified the Chief 
Financial Officer (CFO) and the Deputy Director-General of specialised services and clinical 
support services, about the offer made by KZN Oncology Inc.689 He also suggested that the 
company have access to the machines at Addington Hospital, so that the machines could be 
evaluated by KZN Oncology Inc’s field service engineers.690 However, a senior Addington-
based engineer reported to MeRAN that on 10 July 2015, the field engineer conducted repairs 
on the machines and did not just evaluate the machines, as initially planned.691 As a result, 
the Standard Operating Procedure had been breached by the accounting officer, by allowing 
an unauthorised service provider to repair the Varian machines.692 
Furthermore, as previously mentioned, KZN Oncology Inc engaged technicians from 
Oncology Services International (OSI), to conduct the repair of machines.693 This had been 
done despite the written objections from Varian (sole provider of machines), that OSI was not 
authorised to ‘service, provide parts and maintain Varian oncology equipment’.694  
 
5.7.1   Payment to KZN Oncology Inc 
On 29 September 2015, the sole proprietor of KZN Oncology Inc sent a written quotation to 
the accounting officer, stating that the cost for repair of machines would be R5 490000.695 
 
684 Health Professions Council of South Africa. Guidelines for Good Practice in the Healthcare Professions. 
Booklet 1. General Ethical Guidelines for Health Professions (2016) 10.2. 
685 MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 19. 
686 Ibid. 
687 MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 24. 
688 KZN Treasury Report para 18.2.6 – 18.2.8 c.f. MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 19. 
689 MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 19. 
690 Ibid. 
691 MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 19. 
692 MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 23. 
693 KZN Treasury Report para 18.2.12 c.f. MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 20. 
694 KZN Treasury Report para 18.2.13 c.f. MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 20. 
695 KZN Treasury Report para 18.2.15 c.f. MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 20. 
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The quotation also stated that the maintenance for both machines would be R530 000 per 
month.696 The offer by KZN Oncology Inc was twice more than the offer made by Tecmed.  
The request for payment by KZN Oncology Inc was authorised by the accounting officer, 
however, he did not approve the deviation from supply chain management.697 The Treasury 
report also stated the Treasury regulations had been breached, as a result of the payment 
made to KZN Oncology Inc.698 
In addition, the Report by KZN Treasury cited the Public Finance Management Act699 
(PFMA), in relation to the payment made to KZN Oncology Inc.700 The Treasury Report 
concludes that the payment can be deemed as ‘irregular expenditure’701, in terms of the 
PFMA.702 
The Report goes on to cite the responsibilities of an accounting officer, as provided for in the 
PFMA.703 The Act704 lists numerous responsibilities of an accounting officer, in particular, 
the duty to detail irregular, fruitless and wasteful expenditure in terms of section 40(3)(b)(ii) 
of the PFMA.705 The KZN Treasury determined there was no evidence that the accounting 
officer reported the fruitless and wasteful expenditure for the repair of oncology machines.706 
Further, the PFMA provides that an accounting officer must ‘prevent any unauthorised, 
irregular and fruitless and wasteful expenditure and losses resulting from criminal 
conduct’.707 The Act708 also states that the accounting officer for a government department is 
responsible for making certain that appropriate and effective steps are taken, to prevent 
unauthorised expenditure.709 
The KZN Treasury noted in its Report that it had conducted interviews with all senior staff 
members, including the accounting officer.710 During these interviews, the accounting officer 
together with the other public health officials, claimed that they had refused to retain the 
services of Tecmed, due to alleged irregularities surrounding the procurement of the Varian 
 
696 Ibid - It is important to note that Tecmed had given a quote of R2 579 520 (VAT inclusive) for repair of the 
machines.  
697 MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 21. 
698 KZN Treasury Report para 18.2.23 – 18.2.24 c.f. MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 22. 
699 The Public Finance Management Act op cit (note 137).  
700 KZN Treasury Report para 18.1.18 c.f. MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 23. 
701 S1 PFMA 
‘irregular expenditure means expenditure, other than unauthorised expenditure, incurred in contravention of 
or that is not in accordance with a requirement of any applicable legislation, including— (a) this Act; or  
(b) the State Tender Board Act, 1968 (Act No. 86 of 1968), or any regulations made in terms of that Act; or (c) 
any provincial legislation providing for procurement procedures in that provincial government’.  
702 KZN Treasury Report para 18.1.18 c.f. MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 23. 
703 KZN Treasury Report para 18.3.22 c.f. MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 22. 
704 The Public Finance Management Act op cit (note 137).  
705 KZN Treasury Report para 18.3.22 c.f. MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 23. 
706 Ibid. 
707 The Public Finance Management Act op cit (note 137) Section 38(c)(ii).  
708 The Public Finance Management Act op cit (note 137). 
709 The Public Finance Management Act op cit (note 137) Section 39(b).  
710 KZN Treasury Report para 18.2.29 c.f. MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 21. 
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machines.711 The senior officials in the KZN Department of Health maintained this claim, 
despite these allegations against Tecmed never being proved.712 
It is submitted, that owing to the actions of the accounting officer, there has been 
mismanagement and irregular use of finance which has led to the deterioration of oncology 
services in Addington Hospital. This has had an adverse impact on the provision of oncology 
care in KZN. 
The KZN Treasury recommended that disciplinary action should be taken against the 
accounting officer/head of department for his failure to:  
‘(a) comply with provisions of HTS SOP 
 (b) ensure KZN Oncology Inc had the necessary experience to repair equipment  
(c) comply with various National Treasury prescriptions  
(d) prevent irregular expenditure by paying KZN Oncology  
(e) comply with various prescripts of the PFMA.’713 
It is submitted that the accounting officer is liable for failing to comply with the standard 
operating procedures of the Health Department, deviating from supply chain management, 
and breaching Treasury regulations. Furthermore, he is liable for breaching the PFMA by 
approving a payment to KZN Oncology Inc, that constituted an irregular expenditure in terms 
of section 38(c)(ii) of the Act.714  
In terms of the PFMA, there is a duty on the accounting officer to prevent such expenditure. 
However, it is submitted, that he failed to uphold this responsibility. The Act also creates an 
offence for such failure in terms of section 86, which provides that any accounting officer 
guilty of an offence is liable to a fine or imprisonment.715 
As previously mentioned, the KZN Treasury recommended that disciplinary action should be 
taken against the accounting officer for his misconduct. The PFMA also sets out a 
disciplinary procedure for failing to comply with the act in terms of section 84.716 However, 
there is no evidence of any disciplinary action taken against the accounting officer. It is 
submitted that the MEC for Health must ensure that these corrective steps are taken, so that 
acts of misconduct can be deterred in the future. Furthermore, it is submitted that the Minister 
of Finance must also make certain that the accounting officer is held liable for his actions, 
because the money allocated for the maintenance contract with Tecmed involved funds from 
National Treasury.717 
Due to the above actions of the accounting officer and his failure to prevent the appointment 
of KZN Oncology Inc, he must be held personally liable in damages for the pain and 
suffering, emotional shock and reduced life expectancy of cervical cancer patients who 
 
711 Ibid. 
712 Ibid. 
713 KZN Treasury Report Section 20 (Annexure 20) c.f. MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 25. 
714 The Public Finance Management Act op cit (note 137) Section 38(c)(ii).  
715 The Public Finance Management Act op cit (note 137) Section 86.  
716 The Public Finance Management Act op cit (note 137) Section 84.  
717 MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 17; The Public Finance Management Act op cit (note 137) Section 84. 
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suffered harm as a result of the oncology crisis, as well as the dependants of the patients who 
lost support, can also claim.  
Finally, it is submitted that the accounting officer should face disciplinary action by the 
HPCSA because he has acted contrary to the standard expected from a medical practitioner. 
The HPCSA guidelines state that a practitioner has a duty to society to ‘refrain from 
unnecessary wastage, and from participating in improper financial arrangements, especially 
those that escalate costs and disadvantage individuals or institutions unfairly’.718 From the 
investigations by KZN Treasury, it is clear that the accounting officer failed to uphold this 
duty. 
 
5.8  Chief Financial Officer (CFO) for KZN Department of Health 
The CFO of the KZN Department of Health during 2015 – 2016,719 was 
instrumental in the irregular appointment of KZN Oncology Inc, as well as the in 
payment to the company.720 The payment to KZN Oncology Inc was recommended 
by the CFO on 22 October 2015.721 
The KZN Treasury Report further notes that the CFO also alleged irregularities surrounding 
Tecmed, when questioned by the KZN Treasury on why Tecmed had not been used as the 
service provider.722  
Treasury also stated in their Report that disciplinary steps should be taken against the CFO 
for similar reasons723 that action was recommended against the accounting officer/head of 
department.724 In addition, the report suggests disciplinary action be taken against the CFO, 
for his failure to ensure that there were necessary systems in operation to prevent 
unauthorised, irregular and fruitless expenditure, as set out by the PFMA.725 
It is submitted that the CFO should be held liable for recommending that payment be made to 
an unauthorised service provider, who bypassed procurement procedure. He should be held 
liable together with the accounting officer for all the reasons listed above.726 It is because of 
the CFO’s recommendation that state funds were mismanaged, and this has led to the 
breakdown of oncology services in KZN. As previously mentioned, it is the responsibility of 
the MEC to make certain that disciplinary action is taken against the CFO. 
It is further submitted, that the CFO should be personally liable for harm suffered by cervical 
cancer patients in the form of pain and suffering, emotional shock, reduced life expectancy 
and loss of support for dependants of cervical cancer patients, who have suffered harm during 
2015 – 2017 and have died as a result of delayed cancer treatment. 
 
718 Health Professions Council of South Africa. Guidelines for Good Practice in the Healthcare Professions. 
Booklet 1. General Ethical Guidelines for Health Professions (2016) 9.1.3. 
719 The CFO left the KZN Health department early 2017 c.f. MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 25. 
720 MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 24. 
721 MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 21. 
722 KZN Treasury Report para 18.2.29 c.f. MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 21. 
723 See 5.7.1 for discussion on the reasons provided for disciplinary action against the CFO and accounting 
officer.  
724 KZN Treasury Report Section 20 c.f. MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 25. 
725 Ibid.  
726 See 5.7 for discussion on liability of the accounting officer. 
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5.9     General Manager of Supply Chain Management (GM of SCM Unit) for 
KZN Department of Health 
The KZN Treasury notes that the General Manager of Supply Chain Management during the 
period of 2015-2017,727 had also been influential in the appointment of KZN Oncology Inc as 
the service provider.728 
The Treasury reports that on 14 October 2015, the General Manager of Supply Chain 
Management sent a written request to the accounting officer, for approval of payment for the 
repair of two machines at Addington Hospital, by KZN Oncology Inc.729 The amount of 
R5 490 000 was quoted in the request sent by the General Manager of Supply Chain 
Management.730 Further, the General Manager also provided a motivation in his request for 
the machines to be repaired and serviced by KZN Oncology Inc, despite KZN Oncology Inc 
being unauthorised to conduct the repair.731 
The request for payment by the General Manager of Supply Chain Management was signed 
and dated on 20 October 2015, which was determined by the KZN Treasury as a breach of 
their regulations.732 
According to the KZN Treasury Report, there was an agreement between the KZN 
Department of Health and KZN Oncology Inc in December 2015, for a period of 5 years.733 
The agreement also stipulated an amount of R6 850 000 that would be awarded to KZN 
Oncology Inc, as well as a monthly amount of R435 000 for maintaining two machines.734 
In regard to the agreement entered into during December 2015, the treasury states that the 
National Treasury Practice Note 11 of 2008/09 is relevant, in so far as the requirements 
which need to be met by a company, for their proposal to be considered.735 Therefore, the 
acceptance of an unsolicited bid from KZN Oncology Inc contravened National Treasury 
Practice Note 11 of 2008/09.736 In addition, the prescripts of the National Treasury 
instructions were not complied with including, inter alia, KZN Oncology Inc not holding a 
VAT registration number.737 
After a review of the financial breakdown of the payment to KZN Oncology Inc, the Treasury 
refers to an invoice submitted by the sole proprietor of KZN Oncology Inc.738 The invoice 
reflects an amount of R5 695 641.21, which is R205 641, 21 more than the initial amount that 
 
727 The General Manager of Supply Chain Management left the KZN Department of Health in early 2017 c.f. 
MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 25. 
728 KZN Treasury Report Section 19 c.f. MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 24. 
729 MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 21. 
730 Ibid. 
731 KZN Treasury Report Section 19 c.f. MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 21. 
732 KZN Treasury Report para 18.2.23 – 18.2.24 c.f. MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 21. 
733 KZN Treasury Report para 18.2.31 c.f. MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 21. 
734 Ibid. 
735 KZN Treasury Report para 18.2.32 – 18.2.33 c.f. MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 21. 
736 KZN Treasury Report Section 19 c.f. MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 24. 
737 KZN Treasury Report para 18.2.34 c.f. MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 21. 
738 KZN Treasury Report para 18.3.5 – 18.3.7 c.f. MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 22. 
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was quoted in the contract (ie. R5 490 000).739 No variation from the initial quote had ever 
been approved. The initial quote of R5 490 000 (invoice dated 26 January 2016) also bears 
the Health Technology Service’s stamp, however, the Health Technology Services had never 
been involved in the award made to KZN Oncology Inc.740 
The Health Technology Services lists several reasons in its report to Treasury, why it did not 
sign in approval of the payment to KZN Oncology Inc. They raised the following concerns: 
(a) ‘HTS had not been involved in the awarding of the bid. 
(b) It was not aware of what the repair entailed as it did not receive a 
quotation to generate an order. 
(c) KZN Oncology was not the appointed agent for the original 
equipment manufacturer. 
(d) The non-stock request was not generated at HTS but from Addington 
Hospital - it was not in line with regular SCM procedures, nor was the 
cash flow minutes attached. 
(e) The funds for the expenditure were allocated from Addington hospital 
not HTS. 
(f) HTS could not verify the invoice as an unauthorised third party was 
engaged to carry out the repairs. 
(g) The approved Departmental Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) 
prescribed that ‘only services from the sole provider/supplier of the 
equipment shall be utilized for all repair/services’ The HTS team 
requested that the matter be referred back to Departmental Central 
Supply Chain Management Services’.741 
 
Despite the concerns raised above, on 16 March 2016 the General Manager of Supply Chain 
Management requested that a payment of R5 695 641.21 be made to KZN Oncology Inc.742 
The KZN Treasury noted that this amount was an unsolicited bid, which had been contrary to 
the relevant National Treasury regulations and was deemed ‘irregular expenditure’ as defined 
by section 1 of the PFMA.743  
Treasury recommended that the General Manager of Supply Chain Management should face 
disciplinary action for his failure to prevent such expenditure.744  
It is submitted that the General Manager of Supply Chain Management must be held liable 
for motivating the payment made to KZN Oncology Inc, and breaching Treasury regulations. 
Although disciplinary action was recommended against the General Manager of Supply 
Chain Management for his failure to prevent the irregular expenditure, no disciplinary action 
has been taken thus far.  
Therefore, the MEC must ensure that the General Manager of Supply Chain Management 
faces the disciplinary action recommended by KZN Treasury.  
 
739 Ibid. 
740 Ibid. 
741 KZN Treasury Report para 18.3.8 c.f. MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 22. 
742 MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 23. 
743 KZN Treasury Report para 18.1.18 c.f. MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 23. 
744 KZN Treasury Report Section 20 c.f. MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 25. 
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The General Manager of Supply Chain Management must be held liable for his failure to 
prevent the appointment of KZN Oncology Inc, because he could reasonably foresee that the 
company was not equipped to handle the machines, which was stated the sole provider of the 
machines ie. Varian. The motivation of KZN Oncology Inc by the General Manager of 
Supply Chain Management, has eventually led to harm being caused to cervical cancer 
patients in KZN.  
It is submitted that the General Manager of Supply Chain Management must be held 
personally liable in damages for the pain and suffering, emotional shock, reduced expectancy 
of life and loss of support for dependants of cervical cancer patients in KZN, who lost their 
lives as a result delayed oncology treatment and diagnosis.  
5.9.1   Inconsistent Figures  
It is important to highlight that the reports by MeRAN and KZN Treasury did not point out 
the inconsistent amounts, relating to KZN Oncology Inc contract. The Treasury report 
mention 3 different figures about the payment made to KZN Oncology Inc: 
1. September, 2015 – A quote of R5 490 000 was given by KZN Oncology Inc to the 
KZN Department of Health for repair of two Varian machines, and an amount of 
R530 000 per month for maintenance of both machines.745 
 
2. December, 2015 – An agreement was entered into between KZN Oncology Inc and 
the KZN Department of Health, which stipulated an amount of R6 850 000 for the 
repair of two machines, and a further amount of R435 000 per month for maintenance 
of machines, for a period of five years.746 
 
 
3. March, 2016 – An amount of R5 695 641, 21 reflects on the invoice submitted by the 
sole proprietor of KZN Oncology Inc, as payment to the company for the attempted 
repair of the Varian machines.747 It was also confirmed by Treasury that this amount 
had been paid to KZN Oncology Inc.  
 
It is not clear which of these conflicting figures was the actual amount paid to KZN Oncology 
Inc. Even though the invoice reflects that R5695 641,21 was paid to KZN Oncology Inc, the 
agreement between the company and the KZN Department of Health stipulates an amount of 
R6 850 000. Therefore, considering the gross irregularities that has plagued the appointment 
of KZN Oncology Inc, the inconsistent amounts need to be clarified by the accounting officer 
and the CFO, to ascertain the actual amount received by KZN Oncology Inc.  
More concerning is that the payment to KZN Oncology Inc reflects on the Government 
Gazette as a payment made for ‘private cleaning services’ and not labelled as ‘repair of 
machines’. It is submitted that this inconsistency must also be clarified by the public officials 
involved, during the disciplinary hearing conducted by the MEC.  
 
745 KZN Treasury Report para 18.2.15 c.f. MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 20. 
746 KZN Treasury Report para 18.2.31 c.f. MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 21. 
747 KZN Treasury Report para 18.3.5 – 18.3.7 c.f. MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 22. 
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5.10   Other Senior Members of KZN Department of Health Management  
The Report by KZN Treasury states that other senior members of management did not 
support the submission by HTS, on its disapproval in the appointment of KZN 
Oncology Inc.748 MeRAN further notes that these senior members were also 
implicated in a contract which had been rendered grossly irregular.749 Therefore, it is 
submitted, that there is a pattern of irregular conduct by these public health officials. 
It is submitted that these members should be held liable for supporting the appointment of 
KZN Oncology Inc, and failing to uphold the disapproval of the company with HTS. Their 
support of HTS would have prevented the appointment of KZN Oncology Inc, and thus 
avoided the breakdown of the Varian machines. They failed to take the necessary steps to 
prevent or stop the harm suffered by cervical cancer patients. Therefore, they should be held 
personally liable for damages.  
Furthermore, the senior public health officials who are also medical practitioners must face a 
disciplinary hearing conducted by the HPCSA, as a result of their failure to act according to 
the medical ethics and standard of care the profession requires.  
 
5.11   Omissions by the KZN Treasury Report  
MeRAN submits that there are omissions in the KZN Treasury Report.750 Firstly, MeRAN 
points out that according to the Government Gazette, the tender number provided for KZN 
Oncology Inc (ie. ZNQ889/15/16) is recorded as ‘private cleaning service provider’, with a 
corresponding quote of R5 900 000.751 It is not labelled as a tender for the repair of oncology 
machines. Further, the tender bears the HTS stamp, however, as previously mentioned HTS 
refused to endorse the payment to KZN Oncology Inc.752 It is alleged by a senior member of 
management in the KZN Department of Health, that the HTS stamp was removed from their 
offices and held by head office in Pietermaritzburg.753 
Therefore, it is submitted, that during the disciplinary hearing of public health officials, these 
irregularities must be resolved and the relevant officials, held accountable.  
 
5.12    Recommendations by MeRAN 
Over the past 5 years, the Department of Health in KZN has been denying patients access to 
life-saving treatment, by making continuous allegations surrounding irregular 
procurements.754 Despite these allegations there has never been any evidence put forward by 
the KZN Health Department, to support any of these allegations.755 Furthermore, no 
 
748 KZN Treasury Report para 18.3.10 c.f. MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 22. 
749 MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 25. 
750 MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 26. 
751 Ibid. 
752 Ibid. 
753 Ibid. 
754 MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 34. 
755 Ibid. 
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explanation has been provided on what happened to the funds originally allocated for the 
maintenance contract with Tecmed, by National Treasury.756 
In addition, MeRAN emphasises that the contract with KZN Oncology Inc was not just 
irregular, but also put many lives in danger because it allowed unauthorised personnel (ie. 
technicians from KZN Oncology Inc), to interfere with nuclear machines.757 The interference 
by KZN Oncology Inc resulted in a new machine being damaged beyond repair.758 
It has also been reported by MeRAN that statistics show, one third of female cancers in South 
Africa are breast and cervical cancers.759 Statistics also show that approximately 50% of all 
cancer patients require radiotherapy.760 MeRAN also comments on the astounding reality that 
many of the members in management who have been implicated in denying access to 
oncology services, are doctors by profession.761 The actions of these medical practitioners are 
a contradiction of the medical ethics they are bound by.762 
Many of the cancer patients that are known to MeRAN suffer from cervical cancer, which as 
previously discussed, can be easily cured if treated soon after diagnosis.763 Therefore, it 
seems that during the oncology crisis in KZN, countless number of cervical cancer patients 
have died due to the lack of treatment because of the dysfunctional machines.764 
MeRAN strongly agrees with the findings of the KZN Treasury, in that the sole proprietor of 
KZN Oncology Inc must pay back the money he claimed for repairs, as well as the money for 
damage caused to the new Varian machine.765 Furthermore, there is an offence provided by 
the Hazardous Substances Act which sets out a criminal charge for breaching the act.766 
In addition, MeRAN also agrees with the position taken by McQuoid-Mason who states that 
culpable homicide is the appropriate charge for public officials, who knowingly denied 
cancer patients’ access to health care.767 McQuoid-Mason also suggests that public officials 
who act with ‘eventual intention’, ie. they subjectively foresaw their act or omission could 
kill someone but failed to take corrective action, then these officials may be guilty of the 
common law crime of murder.768 McQuoid-Mason used this reasoning when commenting on 
the Life Esidimeni Tragedy, which also dealt with a denial of proper access to health care due 
 
756 Ibid. 
757 Ibid. 
758 Ibid. 
759 MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 35. 
760 Ibid. 
761 Ibid. 
762 Ibid. 
763 MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 36. 
764 Ibid. 
765 Ibid. 
766 The Hazardous Act ibid (note 619) Section 19. See 5.5 for discussion on the criminal sanction.  
767 MeRAN Report op cit (note 537) 37. 
768 Burchell J Principles of Criminal Law 3rd Edition (2006) c.f. DJ McQuoid-Mason ‘Life Esidimeni deaths: Can 
the former MEC for health and public health officials escape liability for the deaths of the mental-health 
patients on the basis of obedience to ‘superior orders’ or because the officials under them were negligent?’ 
(2018) (11) SAJBL 6. 
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to the acts of public officials.769 Furthermore, McQuoid-Mason adds that if public officials 
negligently fail to take reasonable steps to prevent deaths of patients, they may also be found 
guilty of culpable homicide.770 
 It is submitted that the ‘reasonable steps’ which should have taken by the KZN public health 
officials, was to continue the contract with the authorised service provider ie. Tecmed. This 
would have ensured the upkeep of oncology machines at Addington Hospital, thus preventing 
numerous cervical cancer deaths. 
Apart from the criminal sanctions, public officials could also be liable to compensate 
surviving cervical cancer patients, for the physical and psychological harm caused during 
2015-2017.771 Further, the public officials could be asked to compensate families of the 
deceased patients, for the psychological harm suffered.772 This was the relief granted in the 
Life Esidimeni tragedy. It is submitted that this is the most suitable remedy for cervical 
cancer patients who have suffered harm during 2015 – 2017.  
It is further submitted that constitutional damages could also be a possible remedy for 
cervical cancer patients, whose right of access to health care was infringed upon during the 
oncology crisis. Although common law damages may be broad enough to provide relief for 
the breached constitutional right, constitutional damages may also be appropriate in this case 
considering the harrowing violation of cervical cancer patients’ right to access health care, 
and the public official’s blatant disregard for their constitutional duties.773 It could also aid in 
vindicating the right of access to health care. This remedy was used in the Life Esidimeni 
Tragedy case which, like the oncology crisis, involved a termination of contract with an 
authorised service provider and awarded the contract to an entity who were not equipped to 
take care of mental health care patients.774  
 
5.13    Conclusion  
This chapter listed individuals in the public health sector, who were instrumental in the 
collapse of the Varian machines at Addington Hospital. It also considered the report by 
MeRAN which detailed the actions of several public health officials, that held senior 
positions in the KZN Department of Health, during 2015 – 2017.  
The chapter went on to evaluate the findings of the KZN Treasury and MeRAN, which 
identifies and details the irregular tender awarded to KZN Oncology Inc. Further, it discussed 
 
769 DJ McQuoid-Mason ‘Life Esidimeni deaths: Can the former MEC for health and public health officials escape 
liability for the deaths of the mental-health patients on the basis of obedience to ‘superior orders’ or because 
the officials under them were negligent?’ (2018) (11) SAJBL 5-7.  
770 McQuoid-Mason op cit (note 573) c.f. McQuoid-Mason op cit (note 719). 
771 Mcquoid- Mason op cit (note 598) c.f. McQuoid-Mason op cit (note 719). 
772 Ibid. 
773 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security (1997) ZACC 6 at para 60; Dikoko v Mokhatla (2006) (6) SA 235 (CC) at 
para 91, Law Society of South Africa and Others v Minister for Transport and Another (2010) ZACC 25 at para 
74; Minister of Police v Mboweni and Another (2014) 2014 (6) SA 256 (SCA). See also paragraph 156 of the 
Arbitration Award accessed from http://www.gauteng.gov.za/government/departments/office-of-the-
premier/Life%20Esidimeni%20Documents/Life%20Esidimeni%20arbitration%20award%20by%20retired%20De
puty%20Chief%20Justice%20Dikgang%20Mosenke.pdf (accessed on 23 November 2018).  
774 See 4.2.2.2.1 for discussion on the Life Esidimeni Tragedy.  
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the impact of the tender award on the oncology crisis in KZN, particularly involving 
Addington Hospital.  
In addition, it established that the allegations against Tecmed, which were used as the reason 
by the KZN public health officials, for terminating the service contract with the entity were 
never been proven to be true. The company has never been charged but rather continues to 
service oncology machines in KZN Hospitals. 
This chapter also discussed the maladministration of funds by the finance officers in the 
Department of Health, and the ways in which the funds were misused. MeRAN puts forward 
their recommendations on who should be held liable for the breaching of numerous policies 
and legislation governing health care in South Africa. Furthermore, MeRAN emphasises that 
KZN Oncology Inc should pay back the money they received, as well as, to replace the 
machine that had been damaged by their technicians.  
The chapter states public health officials who were involved in the irregular appointment of 
KZN Oncology Inc, thus contributing to the breakdown of oncology machines, must be held 
personally liable for damages. It also suggests that constitutional damages could be an 
appropriate remedy to cervical cancer patients, whose constitutional right of access to health 
care has been violated. Further, it provides that a structural interdict must be issued against 
the MEC of Health, to ensure that disciplinary action is taken against each public health 
official involved in the oncology crisis and whose actions have led to harm suffered by 
cervical cancer patients.  
It is also submitted that all medical practitioners who hold positions of management in the 
KZN Department of Health must also face disciplinary hearings by the HPCSA, to ascertain 
whether their actions conform to the ethical standard of the profession.  
The root cause of the oncology crisis was the irregular appointment of KZN Oncology Inc, 
the entity directly responsible for the breakdown of machines. This appointment has led to 
loss of oncology staff, poor referral systems, backlog of patients at neighbouring oncology 
units in KZN public hospitals, delayed treatment and loss of lives.  
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CHAPTER SIX:  CONCLUSION 
 
6.1     Introduction 
This dissertation sought to highlight the position of cervical cancer patients in KZN, during 
the oncology crisis between 2015 – 2017. The research focused on a marginalised group ie. 
women, who are recognised as previously disadvantaged in South Africa.775 This was done to 
demonstrate the disproportionate effect that delayed oncology treatment, has had on this 
group of individuals.  
The prevalence of cervical cancer in Kwa-Zulu Natal and South Africa as a whole, as well as 
the preventability and curability of the disease, influenced the reason for the study to serve 
the need of finding an effective remedy for these patients who have suffered harm.  
In Section 27 v Minister of Education,776 Kollapen J stated that relief for a human right 
violation had to also address the negative impact it created.777 Therefore, although multiple 
reports778 have stated that oncology treatment for patients has finally resumed in KZN, the 
primary contribution of this dissertation is to layout civil remedies for cervical cancer patients 
and their dependants, who did not receive timeous treatment during the crisis. The 
dissertation also proposes the most effective and appropriate remedies for women affected by 
the oncology crisis, in light of the circumstances.  
Swanepoel states, that civil litigation by our courts can only successfully contribute to 
remedying socio-economic rights that have been infringed, if the relief granted is able to 
effectively deal with the human right violations.779 Therefore, it is submitted, that this 
dissertation intended to propose a remedy that would be the most effective and appropriate to 
bring relief for cervical cancer patients, considering the type of harm they have experienced.  
 
6.2      Recommendations  
Against the backdrop of the type of harm likely suffered by cervical cancer patients, this 
dissertation proposes: 
 
 
775 SAHRC ‘Research brief on gender and equality in South Africa’ (2013-2017) 6 accessed from 
https://www.sahrc.org.za/home/21/files/RESEARCH%20BRIEF%20ON%20GENDER%20AND%20EQUALITY%20I
N%20SOUTH%20AFRICA%202013%20to%202017.pdf (accessed on 6 January 2019).  
776 Section 27 v Minister of Education supra at note 396.  
777 See 4.3.3.2. for discussion of the Section 27 case.  
778 ‘Oncology treatment to resume at Addington Hospital’ 13 June 2018, DailyNews accessed from 
https://www.iol.co.za/dailynews/oncology-treatment-to-resume-at-addington-hospital-15454710, 
http://www.kznhealth.gov.za/speeches/2018/Oncology-services-Addington-12062018.htm, 
https://www.iol.co.za/mercury/news/cancer-crisis-in-kzn-has-been-dealt-with-17716460.  
There have also been conflicting reports by Advocacy group, MeRAN, who claim that treatment has not fully 
resumed, and that patients were still not receiving timeous treatment – ‘Advocacy group slams oncology 
claims’ 18 October 2018, MercuryNews accessed from https://www.iol.co.za/mercury/news/advocacy-group-
slams-oncology-claims-17538846. 
779 Swanepoel P op cit (note 236) 185. 
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6.2.1     Common law damages  
Based on the conclusions drawn in chapter four and five, it was recommended that the most 
appropriate relief for cervical cancer patients who have experienced loss in 2015 – 2017, 
would be to seek common law damages in the form of pain and suffering, emotional shock, 
and reduced life expectancy for patients, who can show that their cancers have progressed 
from a curable stage to a terminal stage during the crisis, as well as, damages for loss of 
support for families of cervical cancer patients who have died as a direct result of delayed 
oncology treatment. Further, it is important to remember that a claim to common law 
damages is subject to the limitations of prescription.780 
 
6.2.2   Constitutional damages  
The study also uses authority from the Life Esidimeni tragedy to suggest that constitutional 
damages may be a possible remedy for cervical cancer patients, because of the blatant and 
consistent violation of their right to access health care, over a long period of time. The 
circumstances surrounding the Life Esidimeni tragedy mirror the issues present in the 
oncology crisis, since they both involve a termination of contract with an authorised service 
provider, by the deliberate actions of public health officials. In both instances, many lives 
were lost, and the health condition of patients deteriorated.781 Constitutional damages could 
also be effective in vindicating their right of access to health care, while simultaneously 
restoring their faith and reliance on the Constitution. 
 
6.2.3    Personal liability  
In light of the KZN public health officials’ complete disregard for their constitutional, 
legislative and policy duties, this dissertation recommends that health officials who have been 
found liable by the SAHRC and the KZN Treasury, must be held personally liable for the 
harm caused to cervical cancer patients.  
If a public health official cannot afford to pay the full amount, McQuoid-Mason suggests that 
cancer patients can recover the balance from the state, by citing them as a vicarious joint 
wrongdoer.782 Holding these officials personally liable will reduce the negative impact on the 
public purse and deter future infringements by public health officials.  
Further, it should be noted, that public officials who have been alleged by MeRAN and 
SAHRC for their contribution to the oncology crisis, cannot raise the defence of obeying 
‘superior orders’ in order to escape liability for their actions.783 Therefore, a public official 
who obeys an order to support the appointment of the unauthorised service provider cannot 
 
780 Prescription period for a claim of damages is 3 years from the date of the loss. For minors, the prescription 
runs from the day after turning 18 ie. becoming a major.  
781 See 1.2 for discussion on state of oncology care in 2017.  
782 McQuoid-Mason op cit (note 573).  
783 DJ McQuoid-Mason op cit (note 719) 5.  
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raise the defence of superior order; unless the official can prove that he or she feared death or 
serious bodily harm if they did not comply with the order.784 
 
6.3.   Structural interdict  
Whilst the aim of this dissertation is to suggest a remedy for cervical cancer patients who 
have suffered harm, it is also important to make certain in the future, that public health 
officials are held accountable for their actions and for their failure to act in the interests of 
South African women, and our society as a whole.  
Chapter four recommends that a structural interdict should be issued against the KZN MEC 
for Health, to ensure that he enforces disciplinary action against the various public health 
officials who have contributed to the root cause of the oncology crisis, ie. the appointment of 
an unauthorised service provider, that caused the breakdown of machines.785 A structural 
interdict would be appropriate, because of the non-compliance shown by the KZN MEC in 
carrying out the recommendations of the KZN Treasury and SAHRC, which were to hold the 
public health officials accountable. There has been no evidence to suggest that he has 
complied with their recommendations.  
Although this remedy may be regarded as intrusive786, such action is necessary to force the 
hand of the MEC, who has shown a lack of concern for holding individuals responsible for 
these human right violations. 
In addition, it is submitted that a structural interdict has the potential to bring effective relief, 
if there were to be a breakdown of oncology services in the future. The remedy requires an 
individual to remain accountable to the court on the progress of the remedial plan, as well as, 
a supervisory element which enables the court to remain a part of the remedial process, until 
relief has been effected.787 This remedy would be instrumental in ensuring that public health 
care is maintained.  
 
6.4    Disciplinary hearing by the HPCSA 
Chapter four suggests that public health officials who are also medical practitioners, must be 
held accountable for their unethical actions against cancer patients, during the oncology 
crisis. It is recommended that they should face disciplinary action by the HPCSA, for their 
failure to (a) deal responsibly with health resources788, (b) to refrain from financial 
arrangements what will disadvantage an institution789, (c) report patients’ right violations as a 
 
784 McQuoid Mason provides that this is unlikely. Burchell J Principles of Criminal Law (2006) c.f. McQuoid-
Mason op cit (note 733) 6.  
785 See 4.5 for discussion on the structural interdict remedy to ensure disciplinary action is taken.  
786  Mbazira op cit (note 244) 166. 
787 See 3.2.3 for discussion the structural interdict remedy.  
788 Health Professions Council of South Africa. Guidelines for Good Practice in the Healthcare Professions. 
Booklet 1. General Ethical Guidelines for Health Professions (2016) 9.1.1.  
789 Health Professions Council of South Africa. Guidelines for Good Practice in the Healthcare Professions. 
Booklet 1. General Ethical Guidelines for Health Professions (2016) 9.1.3. 
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result of a health practitioner’s unethical behaviour790, and (d) an overall failure to promote 
access to health care as required by the Constitution of South Africa, in terms of section 
27.791 
 
6.5    Concluding remarks  
Individuals who are most dependant on reasonable assistance by the state are often the most 
poor and marginalised of society. It is under these circumstances that effective relief is a 
necessity.792 
This dissertation has aimed to emphasise the need for an effective remedy for cervical cancer 
patients and their dependants who have suffered harm. Further, it has aimed to highlight the 
importance of holding individuals liable for their reckless and negligent actions, which have 
contributed to the oncology crisis, and has violated the constitutional rights of South African 
women.  
Furthermore, considering that oncology treatment has gradually resumed, the dissertation has 
demonstrated how common law damages is the most appropriate remedy to deal with the 
aftermath of the harm suffered by cervical cancer patients, during 2015 – 2017. In addition, it 
suggests that that a structural interdict would be the appropriate remedy to ensure that public 
officials who were found liable, face immediate disciplinary action.  
The structural interdict, in conjunction with personal liability for damages, will also aid in 
deterring future human right violations by public health officials. Finally, it recommends that 
medical practitioners who contributed to the oncology crisis, must face disciplinary hearings 
by the HPCSA for their failure to uphold patient’s interests.  
It is incumbent that the courts, the state, and those affected by the oncology crisis, work 
together in order to bring relief and the vindication of the rights of cervical cancer patients 
and the dependants of the deceased.  
 
790 Health Professions Council of South Africa. Guidelines for Good Practice in the Healthcare Professions. 
Booklet 1. General Ethical Guidelines for Health Professions (2016) 10.1.1. 
791 Health Professions Council of South Africa. Guidelines for Good Practice in the Healthcare Professions. 
Booklet 1. General Ethical Guidelines for Health Professions (2016) 10.2. 
792 Swanepoel P op cit (note 236) 192. 
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